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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite each jurisdiction's roots in the common law, American,
English, and Australian defamation laws have diverged over time in the
level of protection that they afford to the freedom of expression and to
an individual's reputation. This conflict is apparent in the context of the
Internet and global publications. Because the American right to freedom
of expression stems from a constitutional guarantee grounded in the First
Amendment, it acts as a trump on the common law right to reputation.
Consequently, American defamation law both prioritizes freedom of
expression and favors defendants. In contrast, neither English nor Australian
defamation law possesses a similar hierarchical priority of law.
Unconstrained by a similar requirement, both systems prioritize the
individual's reputation and favor plaintiffs, as compared to the United
States. These substantive differences provide plaintiffs with an incentive
to forum-shop. Because each jurisdiction's procedural laws provide
plaintiffs with an avenue to do so, they have seized the opportunity.
This action has brought this conflict to the forefront and threatened to
undermine the speech protections on which American publishers have
grown to rely.
This Article confronts the limits this issue imposes on the First
Amendment in four parts. Part I described the potential for conflicting
defamation laws and forum shopping to undermine the American
media's speech protections in the context of the Internet and global
publications and outlines the Article's overall method of analysis. Part
II first orients these conflicting defamation laws with respect to their
development from the common law. It then frames them in terms of the
underlying structural and policy differences that have produced their
substantive divergence. This frame provides the analytical perspective
through which this Article examines the varying levels of protection
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these substantive laws afford speech and the individual's reputation.
Building from this frame, Part II then demonstrates the manner with
which each jurisdiction's procedural laws facilitate their respective
substantive goals. Lastly, Part II discusses these laws in terms of their
extraterritorial application and views them from an aggrieved plaintiff's
perspective to emphasize both his incentive to forum shop and the ease
with which he may pursue that end. Thus, in the absence of any further
action, the American media must either edit global publications to
conform to foreign law or face potential liability in a foreign jurisdiction.
Part III offers a proactive approach by proposing that American media
take action both through the courts and by modifying its internal
practices to reduce, if not eliminate, its liability abroad. The American
media should not rely on legal reform to harmonize conflicting laws.
The difficulties associated with this approach stem from differences
entrenched in the countries' respective legal traditions, and harmonization
would require either drastic court measures or an intolerable degree of
compromise. Part III proposes that the American media should, instead,
rely on its own initiative and presents the two following courses of
action. Through the courts, a defendant may (1) seek an anti-suit injunction,
(2) assert forum non conveniens, or (3) contest the ultimate foreign
judgment's enforceability. Modifying its internal practices, a member of
the media could (1) utilize a website disclaimer or visitor agreement,
(2) employ geo-location technology, or (3) acquire media liability
insurance.
In conclusion, Part IV submits that the American media should
recognize the limitations on the speech protections it enjoys in the
United States and understand that once it publishes statements on a
worldwide scale via the Internet or another global medium, foreign law
readily applies. While the American media may be accustomed to the
protections afforded by the First Amendment in the United States,
foreign jurisdictions have evolved with their own traditions and cannot
be expected to abandon them to preserve our own. By employing the
means available to them, American publishers may both express
themselves as they have on American soil and respect the degree to
which that expression may be received beyond it.

II. THE CONFLICTING DEFAMATION LAWS:
OF THEIR DEVELOPMENT

A PRODUCT

This Article now examines the conflicting substantive and procedural
laws governing defamation actions in America, England, and Australia
through their evolution from the common law. Tracing their evolution
demonstrates that the divergence stems from structural differences
underlying each jurisdiction's substantive laws. These difference have
propelled each country's ultimate policy choices. Further, each jurisdiction's
procedural laws operate as a means to give effect to their substantive policy
goals. Viewing this conflict from an aggrieved plaintiffs perspective, it
is only logical to forum shop and take advantage of the most favorable
laws available. Thus, American publishers must take heed each time
they publish on either the Internet or another global medium.
A. The Substantive Law-An Evolution Driven by
Underlying Structure & Policy
1. The Common Law
At common law, defamation encompasses both libel and slander.1
Though in certain cases the distinction may blur, libel typically prohibits
defamatory statements that are either written or printed, while slander
typically prohibits defamatory statements that are oral.2 In general, the
elements underlying a defamation suit include (a) a false and defamatory
statement of and concerning the plaintiff, (b) an unprivileged publication
to and received by a third party, and (c) harm to the plaintiff.3 First, "of
and concerning the plaintiff' requires that the statement refer to the
plaintiff.4 Second, the statement must actually be published, for if it
1. Michael Socha, Double Standard: A Comparison of British & American
Defamation Law, 23 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 471, 474 (2004).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 475; Heather Maly, Publish at Your Own Risk or Don't Publish at All:
Forum Shopping Trends in Libel Litigation Leave the FirstAmendment Un-Guaranteed,
14 J.L. & POL'Y 883, 899 (2006) (outlining the English common law elements); Andrew
T. Kenyon, PerfectingPolly Peck: Defences of Truth and Opinion in Australian Defamation
Law and Practice, 29 SYDNEY L. REV. 651, 652 (2007) (providing the Australian
common law elements).
4. Socha, supra note 1, at 475 (discussing the meaning of"a false and defamatory
statement concerning the plaintiff' in the United States, noting that the majority of
United States jurisdictions require that the statement be "of and concerning" the plaintiff,
and explaining that statements which cannot reasonably be interpreted as statements of
truth or fact are not actionable); Maly, supra note 3, at 899 (indicating that under British
law, the plaintiff must "show that the work identified him or her" and that the statement
will be judged by its ordinary meaning in the context in which it was used); Kenyon,
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does not reach a third party, it cannot injure the plaintiffs reputation.5

Once the plaintiff demonstrates that the statement disparages his reputation,
courts presume both its falsity and harm,6 and strict liability applies.7
Under the common law, the defendant must either prove the truth of

his assertion8 or assert a privilege in order to gain heightened protection
for his speech. The fair comment privilege protects "honest expressions

of opinion on matters of legitimate public interest based on true or
privileged statements of fact" made without mal-intent so long as the
privilege is not abused. 9 The absolute privilege protects statements

made in situations where the exchange of information carries such great
importance that knowledge of the statement's falsity and the defendant's
motive are irrelevant.' 0 Lastly, the qualified privilege protects statements
made in good faith on any subject matter in which the person making the
communication has an interest, or with reference to which he or she has

a duty7 to perform, to another person having a corresponding interest or
duty. 1

supra note 3, at 653 (noting that identification requires only that recipients of the
publication "would think the plaintiff is being referred to by the publication").
5.
Socha, supra note 1, at 475 (noting that without publication to a third party, the
statement cannot "be injurious to the plaintiffs reputation").
6. Id. at 476; Maly, supra note 3, at 898-99 (noting that allegedly defamatory
statements are presumed false and actionable in England); Kenyon, supra note 4, at 653
(explaining that once an Australian plaintiff establishes that a published, defamatory
statement identified the plaintiff, the statement's falsity need not be proved, and damages
are presumed).
7. Reynolds v. Times Newspapers, [2001] 2 A.C. 127, 181 (Eng.); Dow Jones &
Co., Inc. v. Gutnick, (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, 600 (Austl.).
8. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 582 (1938).
9. 50 AM. JUR. 2D. Libel and Slander § 317 (2006); Reynolds, 2 A.C. at 193;
Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104, 133 (Austl.).
10. 50 AM. JUR. 2D. Libel and Slander § 256. For example, the absolute privilege
applies to statements made in the course of legal proceedings that are both relevant and
material to redress or relief. Bochetto v. Gibson, 860 A.2d 67, 71 (Pa. 2004); Reynolds,
2 A.C. at 194 (recognizing that in some instances, "the need for uninhibited expression is
of such a high order that the occasion attracts absolute privilege"); Theophanous, 182
C.L.R. at 108 (offering statements during Parliamentary proceedings as an example).
11.
See 50 AM. JUR. 2D. Libel and Slander § 259 (outlining the scope of the
American qualified privilege and privileged occasions); Reynolds, 2 A.C. at 194
(observing that the English qualified privilege attaches where a defamatory statement is
made to a person with "a special interest in learning the honestly held views" even if the
statement is untrue so long as the plaintiff cannot prove that the statement was actuated
by malice); Theophanous, 182 C.L.R. at 133 (explaining that the Australian qualified
privilege "depends on the absence of malice and on the ... communication having an
interest or duty in its making and on the recipient having a corresponding interest or duty
in receiving it").

2. The American Law

Though American defamation law may be rooted in the common law
tradition, the United States Constitution has colored its development.
The result is a set of constitutional privileges that heighten speech
protections over those accorded to the individual's reputation. 12 These
constitutional privileges may be viewed as the constitutional component
to American defamation law. In the United States, the right to freedom
of expression stems from the United States Constitution's First Amendment
guarantee 13 ensuring that "Congress shall make no law ...abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press." 14 The First Amendment's protections
preserve the "unfettered interchange of ideas" that empowers citizens to
implement their desired political and social changes." 5 This interchange
facilitates a well-functioning democracy. It informs its citizenry through a
forum for robust debate where truth is brought to the forefront because16
of the conflicting views that are tested in the marketplace of ideas.
American defamation law protects freedom of expression over the
individual's reputation and7 is regarded as a necessary prerequisite to
effective self-government.1
Even though the First Amendment requires that freedom of expression
be afforded more protection than an individual's reputation, the two
interests remain in flux.' 8 Thus, the individual's right to his reputation
and the states' corollary interest in punishing those who damage that
reputation also limit freedom of expression,' 9 and both are legitimate interests
recognized by the courts.20 In determining whether the First Amendment's
guarantees extend to a certain type of speech, the court must weigh these

12. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (stating that "libel can claim
no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations" and, therefore, "must be measured
by standards that satisfy the First Amendment").
13.

Id.

14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (observing that the free exchange of ideas is a
necessary condition for the implementation of "political and social changes desired by
the people") (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))).
16. Maly, supra note 3, at 892 (discussing the marketplace-of-ideas theory as a
justification for free speech).
17.

Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (stating "public discussion is a political duty"); Time,

Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967) (stating such discussion is necessary for the "the
maintenance of our political system and open society").
18.

Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272 ("Whatever is added to the field of libel is taken from

the field of free debate.").
19. Freedom of expression is not unconstrained; where one individual's rights end,
another's begin.
20.

Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
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competing interests
and strike a balance that maintains their harmonious
2
coexistence.

New York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny shaped the constitutional
standards applied in defamation actions. 2 In New York Times v. Sullivan,

the Supreme Court brought defamation law under the purview of the
First Amendment on the theory that a state's defamation laws may not
override the free speech guarantees provided by the United States
Constitution.2 3 With this hierarchy derived from the source of law in
clear view, the Supreme Court established the "actual malice" standard
for public officials to recover for libel.24 Under the actual malice standard, a
plaintiff must prove that a defamatory statement regarding his official
conduct was made with knowledge or reckless disregard for its truth or
falsity in order to recover for libel.25 In Sullivan, the New York Times
published an ad containing false allegations regarding the number of
times Martin Luther King was arrested and the course of police action
taken on a college campus in response to civil rights activities held in
Alabama.26 Rather than verify the information, the New York Times
relied solely on the reputation of the individual placing the ad in its
decision to publish it." Because the New York Times was at most
negligent and the mere fact that the stories were on file did not establish
the newspaper's knowledge of their falsity, the Supreme Court reversed

21. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 284-85 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 515
(1958) for the proposition that questions involving the First Amendment and a State's
defamation law require that lines be properly drawn between "speech unconditionally
guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated").
22. Id. at 256 (observing that for the first time, the Supreme Court was called upon
to determine "the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit
a State's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against
critics of his official conduct").
23. Id. at 276 (reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment extends the United States
Constitution's application to the states; therefore, a State's defamation laws must be
consistent with the First Amendment where the public has an interest in the speech at
issue).
24. Id. at 279-80 ("The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual
malice' ...."). See also Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (defining public
officials as "at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees
who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over
the conduct of governmental affairs").
25. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
26. Id. at 256-59 (describing the content of the ad).
27. Id.at 261.

the initial grant of recovery to the Alabama Police Commissioner for the
28
inaccuracies.
The Court's reasoning illuminated the First Amendment's purpose and
cast it in terms of a national commitment to the free and open debate
required for a healthy, functioning democracy. The Court reasoned that
the public must be able to criticize its government and public officials in
order to self-govern and act as a check on the government. 29 Though all
views may not be widely held, minority views must be sounded as well,
for self-government requires that each individual have a voice rather
than solely the majority. 30 Rather than force the media to conduct a
cost-benefit analysis or censor those views which when disseminated
of expression in
result in the threat of suit, 31 the Court protected freedom
32
recognition of the role it plays in the public forum.
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the Supreme Court then extended
In this case, the Supreme
the actual malice standard to public figures.
Court addressed two separate actions, but by examining them as a
whole, constructed a framework of analysis for evaluating defamation
suits commenced by public figures.34 In Case No. 37, a Georgia football
coach named Butts sued Curtis Publishing Co. for its allegation that he
had fixed a game by giving the opposing team his game plan.35 In Case
No. 150, Walker sued the Associated Press for its allegations that he had
instigated a charge against federal marshals enforcing a court order.3 6
From the Court's analysis, one may define a "public figure" as any
individual who is involved in a matter of public policy and thrusts
themselves into the public sphere by speaking out on the forefront of an
issue or acting as a figure of general prominence.3 7 Applying this
framework, the Court determined that both Butts and Walker were public
figures and that each must meet the actual malice standard to recover

28.
29.

Id. at 288, 292.
Id. at 297 (stating that freedom ceases to exist if citizens may suffer as a result

of criticizing the government).
30. Id. at 300 (recognizing that without adequate speech protection, minority
groups would not be able to seek support for their causes through publication).
31. Id. at 294. In their concurring opinions, both Justice Black and Justice Goldberg
recognized that high-value judgments would discourage publications containing unpopular

views or criticism of public affairs. Id. at 293, 297.
32. Id. at 270. Speech protections do "not turn upon 'the truth, popularity, or
social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered.'" Id. at 271 (citing NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963)).

33. Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 134 (1967).
34. Id. at 134.
35. Id. at 135-36.
36. Id. at 140.
37. Id. at 154. But see Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976) (holding
that mere public interest is insufficient for the public figure status).
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damages in a defamation action. 38 The Court justified its extension of
the actual malice standard by analogizing public figures to public officials
with regard to their impact on public affairs and the public's reciprocal
interest in those affairs. 39 Additionally, it considered their access to the
media as a means to defend themselves in the public sphere.40
While the Sullivan actual malice standard may apply in the public
sphere, the First Amendment's free speech protections carry less weight
in the private sphere. 4' When confronted with speech relating to private
individuals, the Supreme Court distinguishes between matters of public
and private concern. With regard to private individuals and matters of
public concern, the Supreme Court has held that a negligence, rather
than the Sullivan actual malice standard, applies.4 2 In Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., the Supreme Court justified the distinction between public
and private parties with the observation that public parties have avenues
of self-help made available to them through the media to which private
parties often do not. Because public officials and figures have greater
access to the media, they also have a greater capability to refute falsity in
the public arena than do private parties.43 Lacking this capability, private
parties are more vulnerable and require greater protection.44 Further,
while public officials and figures assume the risk of defamatory statements

38. Butts, 388 U.S. at 154. The Court observed that each "commanded a substantial
amount of independent public interest at the time of the publications" and that while
"Butts may have attained that status by position alone," Walker engaged in "purposeful
activity amounting to a thrusting of his personality into the 'vortex' of an important
public controversy." Id. at 154-55.
39. Id. at 154 (stating that the public interest in the materials as well as the
publisher's interest in disseminating the material was "not less here than that involved in
New York Times").
40. Id. at 155 (noting that both Butts and Walker "had sufficient access to the
means of counterargument to be able 'to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies' of the defamatory statements" (citing Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in
Whitney v. Califomia, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927))).
41. Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974) (distinguishing
public and private figures based on their opportunity to rebut falsity in the public sphere
and voluntary action taken to enter the public sphere as justification for the differing
standards).
42. Id. at 348-49 (ruling that where a private individual sues, the States may
"impose liability... on a less demanding showing" but may not provide for presumed or
punitive damages unless the Sullivan actual malice standard is met).
43. Id. at 344.
44. Id. This greater vulnerability increases the state's interest in protecting private
parties.

by voluntarily thrusting themselves into the public sphere, private parties
involuntarily have defamatory statements thrust upon them.45
The Supreme Court weighed the First Amendment's speech protections
against the individual's interest in his reputation and the state's corollary
interest in protecting that reputation. It found that the First Amendment
does not trump these interests insofar as the actual malice standard
should apply to private individuals.46 The Court found that the balance
of these competing interests in the public arena was achieved through
the actual malice standard but that in the private arena, the balance
required a negligence standard.47
While false statements may have value in the public arena because
tolerating them fosters public debate, such public debate does not occur
with regard to private matters. As such, protecting the individual's reputation
in the private sphere does not compromise this constitutional value. In
Gertz, the defendant published an article for a family whose son was
killed by a policeman claiming that the police officer's attorney was a
communist.4 8 Though the plaintiff was a prominent attorney involved in
a public affair, the Court found he did not rise to the public figure status
and held that he could recover for the falsity of the statement under a
negligence standard.4 9
In PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, the Court established the
burden of proof.5° Regarding matters of public concern, the plaintiff bears
the burden of proof to show the falsity of the statement. 51 Recognizing
the First Amendment's free speech protections, the Court found that
where the falsity is unclear, the interest in free speech outweighs an
individual's interest in his reputation. If the plaintiff can show negligence,
the plaintiff must show actual injury in order to recover.5 3 If, however,
the plaintiff can show actual malice, damages are presumed, and he may
recover punitive damages.54 Where the defamatory statement relates to a
private individual and a matter of private concern, the common law still
applies.5 5 Strict liability and the presumption of harm are operative, and
punitive damages are available.56
45.
46.

Id. at 345.
Id. at 348-49.

47.

Id.

48.
49.

Id. at 326.
Id. at 351.

50. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc., v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1977).
51. Id. at 775-76.
52. Id. at 776 (recognizing that burden of proof allocations "will detennine liability for
some speech").
53. Id.
54. Id. at 774 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974).
55. Id. at 775.
56. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985).
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This progeny of cases reveals that the constitutional component to
American defamation law subordinates the individual's reputation, as well
as the state's interest in protecting it, to freedom of expression. Though
this hierarchy may be colored depending on whether the speech implicates a
public or private individual in a matter of either public or private
concern, it is clear that the First Amendment has shaped the American
jurisprudence in favor of free speech so long as the speech relates to a
matter of public concern. The protection that American courts afford to
free speech results in defendant friendly laws that allocate the burden of
proof more heavily on plaintiffs, and in particular public figures, aggrieved
by defamatory statements.
3. The English & Australian Law
i. Shared Features
Without this express constitutional component present in the development
of either English or Australian defamation law, any heightened protection
accorded to speech stems primarily from the traditional common law
privileges. Though freedom of expression may be valued as an important
part of the political process in both England and Australia,57 the law of
defamation seeks to strike a balance between freedom of expression and
the individual's reputation; "[t]he way in which those interests are
,,58BohEgihadAsrln
Both English and Australian
balanced differs from society to society.
defamation laws strike the balance between freedom of expression and
the individual's reputation more closely than American defamation law.
Additionally, they often do so in a manner that favors plaintiffs and
privileges the individual's reputation over freedom of expression. 59 This
is a product of the structural differences that inhere in each jurisdiction's
laws.
As a matter of policy, the presence of an express constitutional
provision requires that the balance be struck in favor of freedom of
expression in the United States, while the absence of such an express
57. Reynolds v. Times Newspapers, [2001] 2 A.C. 127, 200 (Eng.); Theophanous
v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104, 112 (Austl.).
58. Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Gutnick, (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, 599 (Austl.).
59. Id. at 650. As Justice Callinan observed, "Australian defamation law, and, for
that matter, English defamation law also, and the policy underlying them are different
from those in the United States. There is no doubt that the latter leans heavily, some
might say far too heavily, in favour of defendants." Id.

provision permits the balance to be struck more favorably towards the
individual's reputation in both England and Australia. Whereas the First
Amendment's speech guarantees require that American defamation law
distinguish between public and private sphere, neither English nor
Australian defamation laws possess this express constitutional requirement
or make this distinction. Instead, English and Australian defamation laws
treat plaintiffs equally.6 ° Such equal treatment results in laws that are
more favorable to public officials and figures bringing suit in England
and Australia than in the United States. These plaintiffs do not have to
surmount the higher actual malice standard present in American law.
Also significant are two presumptions still present in both English and
Australian law that are absent from American law as a result of Sullivan
and its progeny-once a plaintiff establishes that the statement at issue
disparages his reputation, English and Australian courts presume both
the statement's falsity and harm to the plaintiff.6 1 As result, the manner
with which English and Australian courts allocate the burden of proof
weighs heavily in favor of plaintiffs. While an American plaintiff in the
public sphere must show both that the statement was false and, at the
very least, actual injury to recover,62 a similarly situated plaintiff in
either England or Australia does not. Rather, all English and Australian
defendants must show the truth of their statements,6 3 a hurdle which
significantly disadvantages their positions in court.
A notable English case illustrates the difficulty that plaintiffs
encounter when attempting to meet this burden. 64 In Irving v. Penguin
Books, Professor Deborah Lipstadt published a book that accused David
Irving of both distorting the supporting data for his Holocaust denial and
reaching unreliable conclusions.65 In defending her case, Lipstadt bore
the burden of proving that the Holocaust did, in fact, take place and was
forced to summon expert witnesses to discredit the historian's theories.66
60. Maly, supra note 3, at 898 (citing RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION
§ 1:9 (2d ed. 1999)); Richard L. Creech, Dow Jones and the Defamatory Defendant
Down Under: A Comparison of Australian and American Approaches to Libelous
Language in Cyberspace, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 553, 554 (2004).

61.

Socha, supra note 1, at 481; Bryan P. Werley, Comment, Aussie Rules:

UniversalJurisdictionOver Internet Defamation, 18 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 199, 201

(2004).
62. This holds true for plaintiffs suing on statements regarding matters of public
concern.
63. Reynolds v. Times Newspapers, [2001] 2 A.C. 127, 203 (Eng.); Werley, supra
note 61, at 201.
64. See Irving v. Penguin Books Ltd., [2001] EWCA (Civ) 1197 (Eng.).
65. Id. at [2].
66. Id. at [7]. Despite witnesses that included a Third Reich military campaign
expert, an execution procedure expert, and a professor on the subject, there still "remain[ed]
good grounds for skepticism as to what had happened at Auschwitz." Id. at [36]. Such a
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Without an express constitutional constraint requiring the contrary, both
English and Australian defamation laws retain elements of the common
law tradition that increase the ease with which plaintiffs may vindicate
their reputations in court. Thus, English and Australian defamation laws
have developed in a manner that protects the individual's reputation
more so than American law does.
Absent the express constitutional component that is present in American
defamation law, heightened speech protection in both England and
Australia stems primarily from the traditional common law privileges
and, more specifically, the qualified privilege. However, while both the
English and Australian courts have begun to shape the qualified privilege
into a vehicle for protecting speech relating to matters of public concern,
this evolving protection still falls short of that afforded by the Sullivan
actual malice standard.
ii. The English Expansion
In Reynolds v. Times Newspaper, the English House of Lords, "built
on the traditional foundations of qualified privilege" and "carried the law
forward in a way" that afforded "much greater weight.., to the value of
informed public debate of significant public issues. ' 6 7 The traditional qualified
privilege provides heightened protection for speech on a "privileged
occasion," which requires a duty to communicate the information and an
interest in receiving it. 68 However, as noted by both Lord Hoffman and
Baroness Hale of Richmond in Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe
Sprl., the "Reynolds privilege" may be "a 'different jurisprudential creature'
from the law of privilege" and may "more appropriately be called the
Reynolds public interest defense," when viewed as the following twostep inquiry.69
As formulated by Lord Hoffman, the first prong examines whether the
article's subject matter, including the defamatory statement, falls within
the public interest."' In making the determination, the judge should

statement bolsters the contention that it is exceedingly difficult to prove the truth of a
statement, even if it has great evidentiary support.
67. Jameel v. Wall Street Journal, [2006] UKHL 44, (2006) 4 All E.R. 1279, 1290
(Eng.) (commenting on the impact of Reynolds on the qualified privilege); see Reynolds,
2 A.C. 127.
68. Jameel, 4 All E.R. at 1294.
69. Id. at 1292, 1321.
70. Id. at 1292.

consider whether the publication as a whole "was privileged because of
its value to the public." ' 7 1 If so, the judge then determines whether "the
inclusion of the defamatory material was justifiable" with allowances for
editorial judgment because often this determination will depend on the
article's presentation, and opinions may differ as to the details required
to communicate its overall message.72 If the article, including the
defamatory statement, satisfies the public interest test, the inquiry shifts
to the second prong, which considers whether the defendant met the
standards of responsible journalism. 73 Responsible journalism requires
and responsibly in gathering and publishing the
"behav[ing] fairly
74
information."
Though Lord Nicholls first formulated the standard in Reynolds to
evaluate a newspaper publication, the defense is "available to anyone
who publishes material of public interest in any medium' 75 and "must be
applied in a practical and flexible manner., 76 As a guide, the judge may
consider the non-inclusive list of factors first propounded by Lord
Nicholls in Reynolds.77 These factors include the seriousness of the
allegation; the nature of the information and the extent to which the
subject matter is a matter of public concern; the source of the
information; the steps taken to verify the information; the status of the
information; the urgency of the matter; whether the comment was sought
from the plaintiff, whether the article included the plaintiffs side of the
story; the article's tone; and the circumstances of publication, including
relevant time pressures.78
Fashioned in this way, the Reynolds public interest defense diverges
from the traditional qualified privilege in that it focuses on whether the
published material was privileged rather than the occasion on which it
was published. Lord Hoffman proposed that the Reynolds decision
established that journalists have a general professional duty to impart
information and that the public has an interest in receiving it as a matter
of law. 79 Thus, if the publication's subject matter satisfies the public
interest test, the publication satisfies the traditional qualified privilege's

71. Id. (noting that this inquiry falls under the judge's discretion).
72. Id. at 1295.
73. Id.at 1296.
74. Id. at 1297.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. Lord Hoffman clearly stated that these factors are "not tests which the
publication has to pass." Id.
78. Reynolds v. Times Newspapers, [2001] 2 A.C. 127, 205 (Eng.); Jameel, 4 All
E.R. at 1298.
79. Jameel, 4 All E.R. at 1296.
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duty-interest requirement.80 Viewed in this light, Lord Nicholls may have
employed the term privilege when he first established
the defense;
81
however, "it is clearly not being used in the old sense."
Though the Reynolds public interest defense may be viewed as a
different jurisprudential creature, indeed, a more nuanced understanding
reveals that, it is a flexible adaptation that extends the qualified privilege's
protection to "statements published to the world at large." 82 Because the
journalist has a professional duty to disseminate information of public
concern and the public has a corresponding duty in receiving it,83 neither
Lord Bingham of Cornhill nor Lord Scott of Foscote found the defense
rejected the qualified privilege's duty-interest approach, even where
formulated in terms of a general professionalduty.84 Asking whether the
publisher meets the standards of responsible journalism is an extension
of this approach, for "there is no duty to publish and the public have no
interest to read material which the publisher has not taken reasonable
steps to verify.

'85

The expression responsiblejournalism is merely a phrase

"usefully coined as a succinct summary-but only a summary-of the
86
circumstances" under which a publisher may claim the privilege.
Viewed in this light, the Reynolds defense may still be regarded as the
Reynolds privilege because the traditional qualified privilege's dutyinterest test determines whether an article was published on a privileged
occasion. Its focus remains on whether the occasion for publication was
privileged rather than whether the published material was privileged.
Under either view, Reynolds significantly increased the protection
extended to publications regarding matters of public concern. However,
the new approach still falls short of protection afforded by the Sullivan
actual malice standard, for it hinges on a case-by-case inquiry and allocates
the burden of proof to defendants. Unlike the Sullivan actual malice
standard, the Reynolds privilege or defense does not provide categorical87
protection to matters of public concern or political information.
Ambiguity may be resolved in favor of publication,88 but determining
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id. at
Id.at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id. at

1295.
1318-19.
1296.
1315.
1291.
1319.
1294.

88. Reynolds v.Times Newspapers, [2001] 2 A.C. 127, 205 (Eng.).

whether a publication's subject matter is a matter of public interest and
whether the publication itself satisfies the standard of responsible
journalism is conducted on a case-by-case basis.89
Each of these inquiries may yield unreliable protection for the following
two reasons. First, whether a publication satisfies the public interest test
is a discretionary matter. 90 Second, the responsible journalism test may
have been described as an objective inquiry; however, the factors involved
in the determination and alternative sources of guidance such as the
Code of Practice are just that-they are guides, not binding.9 This
determination may not truly be objective until a body of illustrative case
law fully develops. Thus, as compared to the categorical protection afforded
by the Sullivan actual malice standard, the extent to which a publication
will actually receive protection under the Reynolds defense or privilege
remains to be seen.
Moreover, the defense or privilege's burden of proof favors plaintiffs
rather than the defendants in need of its protection. Rather than require
that the plaintiff surmount a formulation of the Sullivan actual malice
standard, the defendant must prove that the Reynolds requirements are
satisfied. 92 In contrast to the influence that the United States Constitution
may have had on the development of its defamation laws, Lord Nicholls
emphasized that the English common law strictly protects reputation and
explicitly rejected the Sullivan actual malice standard in Reynolds.93
Lord Nicholls found that the standard would leave individuals too
vulnerable.9 4 It is not only "notoriously difficult to prove" 95 but also
encourages rash publications without thorough consideration96 for whether
the public truly had an interest in receiving the information.
While the Reynolds defense or privilege may afford more protection to
publications regarding matters of public concern, English defamation
law balances the interests in freedom of expression and the individual's
reputation in a manner that protects the individual's reputation more so
89. Id. at 195.
90. Jameel, 4 All E.R. at 1296.
91. Reynolds, 2 A.C. at 205.
92. Jameel, 4 All E.R. at 1295.
93. Reynolds, 2 A.C. at 198-203.
94. Id. at 201 (observing that unless the publisher withdrew his allegations, a
"politician thus defamed would have no means of clearing his name, and the public
would have no means of knowing where the truth lay"). While American courts have
faith in a public official or figure's access to the media, English courts do not.
95. Id. Lord Nicholls envisioned a situation where a newspaper maintained the
anonymity of its sources and deprived the plaintiff the "material necessary to prove, or
even allege, that the newspaper acted recklessly." Id.
96. Id. (stating that "a newspaper, anxious to be first with a 'scoop,' would in
practice be free to publish seriously defamatory misstatements of fact based on the
slenderest of materials").
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than the balance struck by American defamation law. To extend categorical
speech protection or reallocate the burden of proof in a manner that
impeded a plaintiffs ability to vindicate his reputation would undermine
this balance, and English law would not go that far.
Even though English defamation law itself may not possess an overarching
constitutional component that is equivalent to the First Amendment's
speech guarantees, the European Convention on Human Rights does exert a
degree of influence on the manner with which English courts construe
defamation law. Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights
provides "the right to freedom of expression. 97 The Human Rights Act
of 1998 both directly incorporates the Convention right in the English
common law and accords it with a "quasi-constitutional status. ' 98 When
faced with a question involving a Convention right, English courts
reconcile the common law with the Convention99 and, though they may
be persuasive authority, 100 consult relevant judgments rendered by the
European Court of Human Rights.' 0 l
For example, in Jameel, the House of Lords considered whether
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights requires that
trading companies show special damage as an essential element for a
libel action. They also consulted a relevant European Court of Human
Rights decision. °2 While the right to freedom of expression provided by
Article 10(1) may seem promising for defendants, Article 10(2) expressly
limits this right as "necessary in a democratic society" and "for the protection
of the reputation or rights of others."' 10 3 Thus, English defamation law
does not contravene the Convention's right to freedom of expression;
rather, it falls within the scope of the right's express limitation. As
noted by Lord Hope of Craighead, the European Court of Human Rights
has recognized that a right of action for libel serves as protection for
97. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf [hereinafter European Convention

on Human Rights].
98. Yuval Shany, How Supreme is the Supreme Law of the Land? Comparative
Analysis of the Influence of InternationalHuman Rights Treaties Upon the Interpretation
of ConstitutionalTexts by Domestic Courts, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 341, 359 (2006).
99. Jameel v. Wall Street Journal, [2006] UKHL 44, (2006) 4 All E.R. 1279, 1279
(Eng.).
100. Shany, supra note 98, at 360.
101.
Jameel, 4 All E.R. at 1279.
102. Id.
103. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 97, at art. 10.

reputational rights, and in his view, imposing special damages on trading
companies would undermine this right.'0 4 Therefore, in Jameel, "[t]he
argument that the change is necessary because the law is incompatible
with art 10 of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human
' 10 5
Rights ...[was] not sustainable."
Though the European Convention on Human Rights as incorporated
into the English common law by the Human Rights Act of 1998 may
guarantee freedom of expression, the interest in an individual's reputation is
a recognized limit on this right. Considered in this light, the Convention
does little to aid a defendant's cause, for the English defamation laws are
consistent with, rather than contrary to, its provisions. Therefore, while
the Convention may stand as an overarching provision that includes the
right to freedom of expression, a defendant may only truly gain
heightened speech protection through one of the traditional common
law privileges or the evolving Reynolds defense or privilege.
iii. The AustralianExpansion
Much like the English House of Lords, the High Court of Australia
has also expanded protection for freedom of expression through the
qualified privilege. However, unlike the English House of Lords, the
High Court of Australia has recognized an implied constitutional
protection for speech that relates to either government or political
matters. 10 6 Stemming from the common law, the qualified privilege may
be asserted where the duty to inform and interest in receiving the
information exist. 07 Though the qualified privilege does not depend on
the statement's subject matter, it may often attach where the defendant's

104. Jameel, 4 All E.R. at 1279 (citing Steel & Morris v. United Kingdom, App.
No. 68416/01, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 403, 435 (2005)).
105. Id. at 1306.
106. See Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills, (1992) 177 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.)
(recognizing an implied protection for speech regarding government matters); Austl.
Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. The Commonwealth, (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106 (Austl.)
(recognizing an implied protection for speech regarding political matters during
elections); Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104, (Austl.)
(recognizing an implied protection for political speech); Lange v. Austl. Broad. Corp.,
(1997) 189 C.L.R. 520 (Austl.) (explaining the basis for recognizing an implied constitutional
protection). The High Court of Australia explained that the Constitution establishes this
implied protection "by directing that the members of the House of Representatives and
the Senate shall be 'directly chosen by the people' of the Commonwealth and the States,
respectively." Id. at 559. The elections required for the Australian representative
government "were intended to be free" and embody "true choicc." Id. at 560. To
exercise this freedom of choice, citizens must have "an opportunity to gain an appreciation of
the available alternatives" through access to information. Id. (citing Capital Television,
177 C.L.R. at 187).
107. Theophanous, 182 C.L.R. at 133.
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speech also falls under the implied constitutional protection.' 08 Like the
speech protections in America and England, the Australian implied
constitutional protection "ensure[s] the efficacious working of representative
government" and restricts both legislative and executive power.'0 9
Pursuant to the Australian Constitution's implied protection, the
Australian High Court has recognized a constitutional defense for defamatory
statements." 0 In Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd., the Australian
High Court held that the defendant may assert the constitutional defense
for statements made in the course of "political discussion" so long as the
defendant did not publish the statement either knowing that it was false
or recklessly without regard for its truth or falsity, and engaged in a
publication process that was reasonable under the circumstances."' The
constitutional defense is extensive, for the Australian High Court's
interpretation of political discussion is quite expansive and "is not
exhausted by political publications and addresses which are calculated to
influence choices." ' 1 2 Unlike the traditional qualified privilege, it depends
both on the statement's subject matter and the defendant's level of care
in preparing the publication.
In Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp., the High Court of Australia
modified the qualified privilege and constitutional defense by condensing
them into a single qualified privilege. 1 3 Because "[t]he Constitution,
the federal, State and territorial laws, and the common law in Australia
together constitute the law of this country and form 'one system of
jurisprudence,""1 4 whether a publication falls under the protection of the
constitutional defense or the common law's qualified privilege "yields
108. Id. at 140. In the context of political discussion, the qualified privilege will
have "little, if any practical significance," because while the qualified privilege may
require that the recipient of the communication have an interest in the statement, "the
public at large has an interest in the discussion of political matters such that each and
every person has an interest, the kind contemplated by the common law." Id.
109. Id. at 125.
110. Id.
111.

Id. at 121, 137.

112. Id. at 124 (quoting ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 152 (1985)). "Political
discussion" may include "discussion of the conduct, policies or fitness for office of govemment,
political parties, public bodies, public officers and those seeking public office" as well as
"discussion of the political views and public conduct of persons who are engaged in
activities that have become the subject of political debate, e.g. trade union leaders, Aboriginal
political leaders, political and economic commentators." Id.
113. See Lange v. Austl. Broad. Corp., (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520 (Austl.) (extending
the qualified privilege to speech in the context of government and political matters).
114. Id at 564.

the same answer."' 1 5 Thus, an extended common law qualified privilege
ensures that the law of defamation conforms to the implied speech
protection contained in the Australian Constitution." 6
Under the Lange modification, a defendant may assert the qualified
privilege for statements regarding government or political matters, for the
public at large has an interest in these statements. Where the defendant
has published a statement that may have reached "too wide an audience," an
audience that does not necessarily have an interest in the statement,
the defendant must show that his conduct was reasonable under the
circumstances. Reasonableness requires that the defendant had a reasonable
basis to believe that the statement is true, did not believe that the statement
was false and took the necessary steps to confirm the statement's veracity.117
Further, unless a response is impractical or unnecessary under the
circumstances, the defendant must have made efforts to acquire and
publish the plaintiffs response to the defendant's publication."1 8 Lastly, a
plaintiff may defeat the privilege upon a showing that the defendant
published the statement with malice, that is "that it was actuated by...
ill will or other improper motive." '19
Though the High Court of Australia expanded its qualified privilege to
protect speech relating to government and political matters, the value
accorded to speech does not outweigh the value accorded to the
individual's reputation. 20 The High Court of Australia justified its expansion,
in part, based on its determination that individuals defamed by the
publications it encompasses would be "adequately protected."' 21 The
publisher must show the reasonableness of his conduct and, even if the
publisher satisfies his burden, the plaintiff may trump the defense by
115. Id. at 566. However, each has a "different significance." Id. The High Court
of Australia explained:
The answer to the common law question prima facie defines the existence and
scope of the personal right of the person defamed against the person who
published the defamatory matter; the answer to the constitutional law question
defines the area of immunity which cannot be infringed by a law of the
Commonwealth, a law of a State or a law of those Territories whose residents
are entitled to exercise the federal franchise. That is because the requirement
of freedom of communication operates as a restriction on legislative power.
Statutory regimes cannot trespass upon the constitutionally required freedom.
Id.
116. Id. at 572.
117. Id. at 574.
118. Id.
119. Id. The plaintiff must show that the "publication [was] made not for the
purpose of communicating government or political information or ideas, but for some
improper purpose"; this improper purpose must be "actuated," for the mere "existence of
ill will or other improper motive will not itself defeat the privilege." Id.
120. The privilege's scope has since been interpreted narrowly. See Levy v. Victoria,
(1997) 71 A.L.J.R. 837 (Austl.).
121. Lange, 189 C.L.R. at 574.
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showing that the publication was actuated by malice. 22 In light of the
defendant's burden of proof in asserting the qualified privilege and the
plaintiffs ability to, nevertheless, undermine its protection, Australian
law still protects the rights of an individual in his reputation more so
than those he possesses in free speech and to a greater extent than
American defamation law. Though the High Court of Australia adopted
a variation on the actual malice standard for matters of public concern,
the plaintiff must only show that the publication was actuated by malice
once the defendant has asserted the qualified privilege and proven that
his publication was reasonable; whereas, a plaintiff in America must
prove actual malice in every case.
An individual's right to free speech confronts another's right to his
reputation where he is the subject of speech that a third party receives.
Thus, defamation law and the courts enforcing it must make value
judgments accordingly and determine where the balance between these
two rights should be struck. In the United States, the First Amendment's
constitutional guarantee shaped American defamation law in a manner
that favors freedom of expression in recognition of the Constitution's
precedence over the common law. In contrast, both English and Australian
defamation law lack an additional constitutional component that has
priority over the common law and mandates higher value be accorded to
freedom of expression. Thus, each has developed in a manner that favors
the individual's reputation.
As the American law favors speech over reputation, it also favors the
defendants who author speech over aggrieved plaintiffs who challenge it.
English and Australian law favors reputation over speech. As a result,
the English and Australian law also favors aggrieved plaintiffs whose
reputations are harmed by offending speech over the defendants who
author it. It is thus not surprising that where a plaintiff has a choice of
forum, he will choose to bring his suit in either England or Australia, as
opposed to the United States, where the defendant's speech protections
rooted in the First Amendment and set over the common law by Sullivan
and its progeny may stand in his way.

122.

Id.

B. The ProceduralLaw-A Mechanism to Further
Substantive Goals
With these substantive differences regarding the protection afforded to
freedom of expression, the forum for a defamation suit becomes
increasingly important, if not determinative of the final outcome. While
the substantive laws in each of these jurisdictions have created an
incentive for plaintiffs to forum shop, the procedural laws have
facilitated their efforts. Under the traditional common law approach, the
place of publication supports jurisdiction 123 and often determines the
choice of law. 24 However, the Internet amplifies the ease with which
plaintiffs may shop amongst forums-articles uploaded on the Internet
may be downloaded and read on a worldwide scale lending support for
jurisdiction in a worldwide choice of forum. Such forum shopping
among plaintiffs undermines the speech protections that inhere in the
United States Constitution's First Amendment guarantees. If a plaintiff
brings his case in a foreign jurisdiction where the laws privilege an
individual's reputation over freedom of expression, choice of law
principles generally permit him to take advantage of them. Because
neither an international agreement nor convention addresses jurisdiction
over Internet materials, 125 each country must determine whether a writ
may be served and jurisdiction may be exercised over defendants,
according to its respective jurisdictional principles.

123. Eric Barendt, Jurisdictionin Internet Libel Cases, 110 PENN ST. L. REv. 727,
733 (2006).
124. Shawn A. Bone, Private Harms in the Cyber-World: The Conundrum of
Choice of Law for Defamation Posed by Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Co., 62 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 279, 288-89 (2005). Bone explains further:
Because publication to a third person is the essential element for actionable
defamation, it has long been the central consideration in defamation choice of
law. Traditional choice of law principles, embodied in the First Restatement of
Conflict of Laws, located the law governing a tort dispute by where the harm
had occurred. "In defamation cases, 'the place of the wrong' was the jurisdiction
where the defamatory matter was heard or read by a third person, regardless of
the place of broadcasting or writing." This was legally sound because it could
be presumed that publication occurred in a place where the plaintiff had a
reputation to be harmed.
Id.
125. John Di Bari, A Survey of the Internet Jurisdiction Universe, 18 N.Y. INT'L. L.
REv. 123, 166 (2005) (explaining that world leaders have been attempting to negotiate a
treaty addressing the jurisdictional problems posed by the Internet yet have failed to
reach agreement due to the difference in value each nation accords to freedom of
expression and the individual's reputation).
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1. The American Approach
In the United States, whether a court may exercise jurisdiction over a
foreign plaintiff, as opposed to the choice of law, is the key inquiry; for
the principles relevant to the choice of law are such that the law of the
forum applies where jurisdiction is proper. To determine whether
jurisdiction will be conferred over a foreign defendant, the United States
has traditionally adhered to the minimal contacts approach first
established under InternationalShoe v. Washington. 26 However, it has
begun to adapt and develop its analysis to accommodate the global
nature of information available on the Internet.127 Under the International
Shoe minimal contacts approach, a court may exercise jurisdiction in
accordance with due process over a non-resident if the defendant has
"minimal contacts" with the forum state, so long as maintaining the suit
28
does not "offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.''
Maintaining the suit in the forum state meets this standard if the defendant
purposefully availed himself to the privileges of the129forum state and
could reasonably anticipate being subject to suit there.
In the United States, jurisdictional issues regarding defamation using
this approach in print publications were readily apparent. Applying the
minimal contact analysis in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, the Supreme
Court held that "[t]here was no unfairness in calling [the national magazine]
to answer for the contents of publication wherever a substantial number
of copies are regularly sold and distributed."' 130 The assertion ofjurisdiction
based on the number of copies sold can be translated into the rhetoric of
the minimal contacts by viewing each copy sold as a contact with the
state; therefore, a substantial number of contacts results in substantial
contact with the state.
126. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (establishing the
minimal contacts approach for jurisdiction as a means to accord jurisdiction over a nonresident with due process).
127. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.
1997) (adapting the minimal contacts approach for determining jurisdiction to the
Internet by incorporating a sliding scale analysis based on the "nature and quality of
commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet").
128. Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320.
129. Id.; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980)
(clarifying the circumstances under which jurisdiction comports with traditional norms
of fair play and substantial justice).
130. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984).

That very same year in Calder v. Jones, the Supreme Court similarly
held that a Florida resident could bring a libel action against the National
Enquirer in California because California was the state of the magazine's
most substantial circulation; therefore, the magazine could readily anticipate
suit there. Here, the explicit mention of the defendant's ability to
anticipate suit in the forum state shows the importance of the defendant's
knowledge regarding the effects of publication in the forum state. In the
context of defamation, whether a defendant had minimal contacts and
purposefully availed himself of the privileges of the forum depend on
the defendant's intent regarding the publication, the harmful effects of
the publication on the forum state, and the foreseeability of that harm on
the part of the defendant.
Despite these considerations, however, the analysis still creates the
potential for proper jurisdiction in multiple fora. If a nonresident commits
an intentional act directed at the forum state-in the case of defamation,
an intentional act may be demonstrated by substantial circulation with a
harmful impact in the forum that the defendant could have foreseenjurisdiction may arise. However, if the circulation reaches a number of
forum states, jurisdiction may arise in each of them. When jurisdiction
is proper in multiple fora, a question arises as to whether such jurisdiction
still comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
The United States' defamation laws provide a safeguard against liability
from publication of a defamatory statement in multiple locations. The
"single publication rule" does not allow multiple defamation suits to
arise from a single defamatory statement published multiple times-13 1
American courts hold that the statement was published only once.
Even though the courts operate under this legal fiction, the plaintiff can
recover for all of the damage that he incurs as a result of multiple
publications.132 For example, in Keeton, the plaintiff traveled across the
country to find the state with the longest statute of limitations in order to
maintain his claim, and though copies of the statement circulated

131.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 577A (1977).

Under subsection (3),

"[a]ny one edition.., or similar aggregate communication is a single publication." Id.
The majority of American courts follow the single publication rule, as opposed to the
multiple publication rule. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 549 A.2d 1187, 1189 (N.H.
1988). The multiple publication rule provides plaintiffs with a separate claim for each
publication of the defamatory material. Id.
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A (1977). Under subsection (4), for
any single publication:
(a) only one action for damages can be maintained; (b) all damages suffered in
all jurisdictions can be recovered in the one action; and (c) a judgment for or
against the plaintiff upon the merits of any action for damages bars any other
action for damages between the same parties in all jurisdictions.
Id.

390
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throughout the nation, the claim was consolidated33to one action in which
the plaintiff recovered for all of the publications. 1
This rule advantages both the plaintiff and the defendant. First, the
rule allows the plaintiff to consolidate his claims into one action to avoid
bringing suit in each forum where the statement appears. 34 Second, the
rule prevents a potential for infinite liability on the part of the defendant
due to the statement's wide initial dissemination or subsequent
dissemination in the future. 135 The rule recognizes that a defendant's
defamatory statement is the product of a single act, even if it is published
multiple times.
Though the United States' defamation laws protect defendants against
the potential for multiple suits in multiple fora, the jurisdictional laws
1 36
have just begun to adapt to the challenges presented by the Internet.
Without any geographic boundaries and the potential for many citizens
of foreign states to view material published on the Internet, a defendant
could have substantial contact with and have purposefully availed
himself to many fora under the traditional minimum contact analysis.
Therefore, courts have begun to adopt a sliding-scale approach based on
and the defendant's level of commercial
the nature of the website
37
activity over the site. 1
First, where the defendant "clearly does business over the Internet"
through his contractual undertakings with residents of the forum that
"involve knowing and repeated transmission of computer files," jurisdiction
is most proper.' 38 Second, where the defendant operates an interactive
website on which the user and operator may exchange information,
jurisdiction may or may not be proper.139 To determine whether to exercise
jurisdiction in these instances, the court must analyze the "level of
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange."'' 40 Lastly, passive
websites where the information is merely posted to a site and made
133. Keeton, 549 A.2d at 1187.
134. Id. at 1189-90 (noting that the multiple publication rule burdened defendants
with the "potential number and geographic dispersion" of defamation suits).
135. Id. (noting that "distribution over a long period of time" also posed a great
burden for defendants under the multiple publication rule).
136. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-25 (W.D.
Pa. 1997).
137.

138.
1996)).
139.
140.

Id. at 1119.

Id. at 1124 (citing CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir.
Id. (citing Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996)).
Id.

available to readers of the forum do not serve as a proper basis for
jurisdiction141
The judgment regarding passive websites is most important for those
without any commercial purpose who use the Internet as a forum to disseminate
their ideas, for under the United States' jurisdictional principles, they
may be shielded from liability stemming from mere readership. The
rationale behind this judgment involves the lack of objective intent on
the part of the publisher to target and acquire an audience in a forum
state.' 42 In Young v. New Haven Advocate, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged
the potential slippery slope that could result from conferring jurisdiction
on a forum state based the availability of a defamatory statement through
an Internet posting. 143 The Fourth Circuit determined both that a defendant's
manifested intent constrains a forum's ability to exercise jurisdiction
over him and that posting to an Internet site was insufficient to
demonstrate such intent. 44 Further supporting this targeting approach,
in Revell v. Lidov, the Fifth Circuit held that an article published out-ofstate on the Internet was not subject to the Texas state court's jurisdiction
because though the article was "presumably directed at the entire
world," the article's subject matter possessed no special connection
to
4
Texas and was, therefore, not specifically directed at the state. , 1
This approach applies in the international context as well. For
example, in Realuyo v. Villa Abrille, the Southern District of New York
declined jurisdiction over a Philippine news service with online
publications because the news service had not "directed [its site] towards
the potential New York audience."'146 The Southern District of New
York followed the Fourth Circuit's decision in Young and refused to
141.

Id. (citing Benusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),

afid, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997)).
142. Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 263 (4th Cir. 2002)
(simplifying the inquiry with regard to jurisdiction over Internet activity to whether the
entity manifested an intent to direct their website content to the audience of that State).
143. Id. (recognizing that exercising jurisdiction over a defendant based on his
publication to the Internet alone would subject him to the jurisdiction of every state in
which a citizen accessed the material).
144. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that "[slomething more than posting and
accessibility is needed to 'indicate that the [defendant] purposefully (albeit
electronically) directed [his] activity in a substantial way to the forum state."' Id.
(quoting Va. Panavision Int'l. L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998)).
145. Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 475 (5th Cir. 2002) (recognizing from Young
that the defendant must target a readership in the forum state). An Internet publication
"directed at the entire world" is insufficient because "one cannot purposefully avail
oneself of 'some forum someplace'; rather... due process requires that 'the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court here."' Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)).
146. Realuyo v. Villa Abrille, No. 01 Civ. 10158 (JGK), 2003 WL 21537754, at
* 11 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2003).
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exercise jurisdiction based on a passive Internet site, for to do so would
subject defendants to suit in every possible forum with access to the
site.' 47 This implication of such an exercise of jurisdiction "would violate
of fair play
the constitutional need ' to
48 be mindful of traditional notions
and substantial justice.'
The considerations relevant to jurisdiction are consistent with those
relevant to the choice of law, for most states apply the law of the jurisdiction
with the "most significant relationship" to both the occurrence and the
parties. 149 In determining the law of the jurisdiction with the most
significant relationship, courts generally consider (a) the place where the
injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred, (c) the domicile or residence of the parties, and (d) the place
most central to the parties' relationship.' 50 Each of these considerations
gives expression to a form of contact that the parties may have with the
forum, which may be used to support jurisdiction. In the defamation
context, the place of publication not only serves as a contact with the
forum but is also both the place where the injury occurred and most
central to the parties' relationship. The harm incurred by the plaintiff as
a result of the publication may be the only basis for the parties' relationship.
Where the publication takes place over the Internet, the targeting approach
only further ensures that the defendant has a significant relationship with
the forum.
2. The English & AustralianApproach
Though neither England nor Australia take an approach to jurisdiction
or choice of law similar to that employed in the United States, the place
of publication is still the most relevant consideration. It acts as a strong
foundation for jurisdiction and determines the law applied. In both
England and Australia, a plaintiff may bring a foreign defendant under
the purview of the court's jurisdiction with a writ of originating
process.15 1 Though a plaintiff must typically seek leave of the court to
147.

Id.

148. Id.
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
150. Id.
151. King v. Lewis, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1329, (2005) E.M.L.R. 45, 47-48 (Eng.)
(referencing the initial establishment of extraterritorial jurisdiction in this case by the
service of a claim form, i.e. a writ of originating process, and discussing the requirements for
potential grant of leave to serve a defendant outside the jurisdiction); Dow Jones & Co.,
Inc. v. Gutnick, (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, 595 (Austl.).

do so in England, 5 2 the writ may be obtained pursuant to an initial
153
presumption locating the appropriate forum where the harm occurred,
so long as the place of publication falls within the court's jurisdiction.
In Australia, such leave is not required. 154 In either case, the defendant
may challenge service of the writ and negate the court's jurisdiction upon a
showing that the forum is either not 56more appropriate in England 55 or
"clearly inappropriate" in Australia. However, as it will be shown in
the forum non conveniens section, a defendant encounters difficulty
with such an argument where the place of publication is concurrent with
the court's jurisdiction.
Where the plaintiff succeeds in establishing jurisdiction, the choice of
law becomes the critical inquiry. This is because any advantage that he
may have won through forum shopping could be lost in the event that
the forum's law does not apply. Because both English and Australian
choice of law principles dictate that the law governing the lex loci delicti
or place of harm be applied,157 the place of publication is determinative.
Assuming the plaintiff has a reputation in the place of publication, the
publication gives rise to the plaintiffs injury the moment a third party
reads it.' 58 Providing jurisdiction and determining the choice of law
based on place of publication shows that both England and Australia
place importance on protecting the individual's reputation-these
procedural principles not only provide the plaintiff with a cause of action
in each jurisdiction where his reputation may incur harm, but also ensure
that the more protective English and Australian laws are applied.
An equally important issue is the English and Australian rejection of
the American single publication rule. Both England and Australia
follow the "multiple publication rule,' 59 which provides plaintiffs with
a separate cause of action for each publication of a single defamatory
statement. 60 Because each publication constitutes a separate cause of
152. Lewis, E.M.L.R. at 45-49. Whether leave will be granted is a discretionary
matter. Id.
153. Id. at 54.
154. Gutnick, 210 C.L.R. at 595.
155. Lewis, E.M.L.R. at 54 (discussing challenging the service of a writ through
forum non conveniens and explaining that "the real question in these cases [is], which
was the more appropriateforum").
156. Gutnick, 210 C.L.R. at 596.
157. Reid Mortensen, Homing Devices in Choice of Tort Law: Australian, British
and CanadianApproaches, 55 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 839, 842-48 (2006).
158. Bone, supra note 124, at 288-89.
159. Lewis, E.M.L.R. at 46 (maintaining the multiple publication rule established in
England under Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, (1849) 14 Q.B. 185, (1849) 117 Eng. Rep.
75 and in Australia under Gutnick, 210 C.L.R 575).
160. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 549 A.2d 1187, 1189 (N.H. 1988) (defining the
multiple publication rule).
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action, it is quite possible for a defendant publishing in multiple
jurisdictions to be subject to suit and the law of each of those
jurisdictions or be required to defend multiple claims in a single
jurisdiction if distribution has taken place over a long period of time.
Despite the potential burden that the multiple publication rule places
on defendants, the English Court of Appeal maintained the rule in King
v. Lewis. The decision was based on the publisher's deliberate choice to
publish on the Internet and, stemming from that choice, the foreseeability of
suit for each of those publications in each jurisdiction where they
appear. 16 1 Though courts in the United States recognize the Internet as a
medium for which the law should be altered, the English Court of
Appeal failed to find that change necessarily followed, for it is the
162
"Internet publisher's very choice" to employ the "ubiquitous medium."
The High Court of Australia's earlier rejection of the single publication
rule in Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick greatly influenced the English Court
of Appeal's decision.1 63 Though the multiple publication rule may
subject a defendant to the laws of multiple jurisdictions and require him
to mount a defense in each of those jurisdictions, Justice Kirby did not
view "ask[ing] the publisher to be cognizant of the defamation laws of
the place where the [plaintiff] resides and has a reputation ... to impose
on the publisher an excessive burden."1 64 As noted by the English Court
of Appeal and brought to the forefront by Justice Callinan in Gutnick,
"[p]ublishers are not obliged to publish on the Internet"; it is a matter of
choice.165 Should publishers choose to publish in a medium that may

161.
Lewis, E.M.L.R. at 57 (acknowledging that under the multiple publication rule,
a defendant may "at least in theory find himself vulnerable to multiple actions in multiple
jurisdictions," but finding those who publish with global mediums "do so knowing that the
information they make available is available"; therefore, "pointing to the breadth or depth of

reach of particular forms of communication" is not grounds for abandoning the rule).
162. Id. at 57-58.
163. Id. (citing Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Gutnick, (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575 (Austl.).
and re-iterating its reasons for rejecting the single publication rule and proposals for
jurisdictional reform in the context of Internet defamation, including (a) the Internet and
other forms of global media are indistinguishable, (b) when publishers choose to publish
on the Internet, they knowingly target a large audience, (c) publishers should accept the
possibility that they may be liable in jurisdictions where their publications are accessible,
and (d) the "vindication of traditional principles relating to publication and jurisdiction in
defamation cases").
164. Gutnick, 210 C.L.R. at 639.
165. Id. at 648.

result in an "uncontrollable" reach of jurisdiction, they must
recognize
16 6
that they must exercise a greater degree of care in doing SO.
The single publication rule recognizes the publication of a defamatory
statement as the product of a single act of authoring. However, the
multiple publication rule recognizes that this single act of authoring has
the potential to harm the plaintiff's reputation in each location of
publication. The divergence in the two approaches stems from a difference
in each jurisdiction's focus-while the American laws focus on the
speaker and his interest in freedom of expression, the English and
Australian laws focus on the subject of speech and his interest in
protecting his reputation wherever it may be harmed. To avoid chilling
speech, the American defamation laws protect the speaker from infinite
liability stemming from a single act by consolidating all claims into a
single action. On the other hand, English and Australian laws provide
for multiple claims by providing for a cause of action in each jurisdiction
where the publication appears to avoid infinite harm to an individual's
reputation.
While English and Australian defamation laws hold fast to the
multiple publication rule and relegate both jurisdiction and the choice of
law to the place of publication, a potential solution for the place of
Internet publication would be the place where the material was first
uploaded, that is the location of web server. Such a modification would
protect American publishers who upload articles on the Internet in the
United States for their American audience.
However, the suggestion undercuts two key principles underlying the
defamation laws in both jurisdictions. First, the suggestion undermines
the policies driving the defamation laws in each jurisdiction-to provide
an avenue for a plaintiff to vindicate his reputation and be compensated
for the harm inflicted on it. Second, the suggestion departs from two
foundational principles in England and Australia. The suggestion would
serve as an adoption of the single publication rule for Internet
publications, which as previously discussed, was rejected. All claims
stemming from a defamatory statement published on the Internet would
be consolidated and litigated in the forum where the publication was first
uploaded. Such a rule for Internet publications would create an
inconsistency between the rules applicable to defamatory statements
published on the Internet and those published via other mediums. Yet,
the underlying tort and harm to plaintiff's reputation is the same in either
case. In addition, and on a more fundamental level, the proper place of
jurisdiction and choice of law are based on the location of the harm-in

166.

Id.
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this context, where the reputational injury has occurred, not the location
of the statement's first authorship.
The High Court of Australia swiftly rejected the modification. As
noted by Justice Kirby, the location of the web server "might bear little
or no relationship to the place where the communication ... had its

major impact."'' 67 If jurisdiction is exercised based on the location of the
web server, the plaintiff may lose his cause of action. This was the case
in Gutnick, for the article at issue was written in America and uploaded
in America for an American readership; yet, the injury occurred in
Australia. Moreover, as Justice Callinan observed, such a rule would
create the potential for authors to insulate themselves from liability by
simply "manipulat[ing] the uploading and location of the data," such that
the material is only uploaded to servers located where the laws are more
defendant-friendly than those in England or Australia, for example the
United States. 168 Most web servers are located in the United States, and
such a rule would result in the dominance of American defamation
laws. 169 The rule would financially advantage publishers in the United
States and legally disadvantage citizens outside of the United States
170
whose reputations have been harmed by the articles published there.
Given the difficulties with this rule, the extent to which the Australian
High Court criticized it, and the extent to which the English Court of
Appeal relied on the Australian High Court in maintaining the multiple
publication rule, it is highly unlikely that an English court would be
amenable to this rule either.
Another solution would be to limit the place of publication to the
location where the audience for which the defendant intended to publish
is located or to formulate it in accordance with American jurisdictional
principles and look at the place where the audience that the defendant
intended to "target" with his publication is found. However, this suggestion
is problematic as well. Constraining the place of publication to where
the defendant's target audience is located would render the determinations
unpredictable. This is because ascertaining the defendant's target audience
would require inquiring into the defendant's subjective intent at the time

167.
168.

Id. at 632.
Id.

169. Id. at 654 (observing that "[tihe consequence, if... accepted would be to
confer upon one country, and one notably more benevolent to the commercial and other
media than this one, an effective domain over the law of defamation").
170. Id.

of publication. 171 In the English Court of Appeal's opinion, determinations
' 72
of this nature would be "liable to manipulation and uncertainty."'
Because this rationale echoes the High Court of Australia's rationale, it
is doubtful that the High Court of Australia1 73would accept a proposal
based on the location of the web server either.
Even if the English Court of Appeal were open to this approach, it
would be hard to argue that any audience was not a target audience. An
author cannot choose to publish on the Internet without the intention of
targeting a large audience; the Internet is a medium intended for mass
publication. As noted by the English Court of Appeal, "those who post
information on the World Wide Web do so knowing that the information
they make available is available to all and sundry without any
geographic restriction."' 7 4 That is the medium's appeal; "[a] publisher,
particularly one carrying on the business of publishing, does not act to
put matter on the Internet in order for it to reach a small target."' 75 The
publisher has "in truth... targeted every jurisdiction where his text may be
downloaded.",171 Again, the English Court of Appeal's rationale emphasizes
the foreseeability of harm and liability in each jurisdiction where the
defamatory statement appears.
Further, where a more narrowly tailored target audience could, indeed,
be discerned, the approach still lacks the capacity to compensate the
plaintiff fully for the reputational harm caused by a defendant's defamatory
statement. The location of the defendant's targeted audience for the
publication has little bearing on where the plaintiffs reputation is
actually harmed, and this injury is the injury that both English and
Australian laws seek to remedy. The defendant may have targeted an
American audience, yet the statements could have found an Australian
audience. Under this approach, the plaintiff would only have a cause of
action in America, even though the plaintiffs reputation was actually
harmed in Australia. This is a shortcoming of the American approach
that runs counter to the policies motivating the English and Australian
defamation laws which emphasize the individual's reputation. With this
in mind, it undermines the substance of the law to formulate English and
Australian substantive law with a focus towards the plaintiffs reputational
harm and the procedural law with a focus that favors the defendant's
speech. Where a defendant may be held liable under the substantive law
without regard to his intent to harm the plaintiffs reputation, it makes
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

King v. Lewis, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1329, (2005) E.M.L.R. 45, 59 (Eng.).
Id.
Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Gutnick, (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, 632 (Austl.).
Lewis, E.M.L.R. at 57.
Id.
Id. at 59.
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little sense to then save him from liability with a procedural loophole
based on the intent that was irrelevant to the substantive judgment.
Though American courts have been open to reform in response to the
Internet, neither English nor Australian courts have accepted arguments
for reform based on the new medium. The divergence may be traced to
the underlying jurisdictional and choice of law principles utilized by
each of these courts. Whereas American courts focus on the foreign
defendant's contact with the forum state, English and Australian courts
focus on the location of the harm. Because the defendant's use of the
Internet would have an impact on the type of contacts that he would
have with the forum state, the new medium merits the adoption of a new
American approach to accommodate its effects. However, a defendant's
use of the Internet does not affect the location of the ultimate harm
resulting from his actions. Since the English and Australian approaches
are based on a factor that has not changed as a result of the Internet, they
do not require modification to accommodate it.
Because legal rules cannot anticipate technological advances, they
should remain "technology-neutral." 1" The Internet has not impacted the
rapid expansion of "the speed and quantity of information distribution
throughout the world" in any way that distinguishes it from other
technological advances that have done the same. 178 An internationally
179
distributed newspaper has no less of a global reach than the Internet,
such as radio and television permit
and other forms of communication
"wide dissemination" as well. 180 The Internet simply does not have a
"uniquely broad reach." 18 1
Much like the structural differences in the substantive law, the
differences in American, English and Australian procedural approaches
further the underlying policies driving each jurisdiction's substantive
laws through their focus and whom they favor. Because the American
approach focuses on the defendant's minimal contacts and whether he
has directed his publication towards a target audience in the forum state,
an audience state, it favors defendants. It furthers the protection afforded to
free speech by limiting the extent to which a defendant may be required
to defend it. Because the English and Australian approaches focus on
177.

Gutnick, 210 C.L.R. at 630-31.

178.

Id.

179.
180.

Id.
Lewis, E.M.L.R. at 29.

181.

Id.

the location of the harm and place of publication generally, they favor
plaintiffs and further the protection afforded to plaintiffs' reputations by
maintaining the extent to which a plaintiff may vindicate it through a
cause of action.
3. The ExtraterritorialApplication
Though the American, English and Australian approaches differ with
regard to their underlying policies, their focus and whom they favor,
each still creates the potential for an extraterritorial application. Because
American courts focus on a defendant's minimal contacts with the forum
state and whether or not he has targeted that state, a defamatory
statement that was written in Australia could have been targeted to a
United States audience and could have created the potential for suit an
America. Because English and Australian courts focus on the location
of the statement's harm, a defamatory statement that was written in
America could harm an individual's reputation in England or Australia
and create the potential for suit in either jurisdiction. Since statements
published on the Internet may simultaneously be targeted at an American
audience yet harm an individual's reputation in America, England or
Australia, the publication creates the potential for suit in each jurisdiction.
However, there is a clear imbalance in the reach of each forum's laws.
If a statement published in America targets either an English or
Australian audience yet harms an individual's reputation in all three
countries, a plaintiff will only have a cause of action in England or
Australia. In either case, the substantive differences between procedural
laws among each of these jurisdictions provide both an incentive and
avenue for plaintiffs to engage in forum shopping. Because the law of
the forum will most readily apply, a plaintiff's procedural choices may
govern the substantive outcome of the case and, more often than not,
undermine an American defendant's First Amendment protections. Given a
choice of forum, the plaintiff would only rationally choose the forum
with the laws most favorable to him. Thus, American publishers must
be mindful of other jurisdiction's laws and, keeping these laws in sight,
edit their publications accordingly or face potential liability in a foreign
jurisdiction. By publishing articles through the Internet or other global
media, a publisher foregoes the speech protections that he would otherwise
have in the United States.
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III. THE PROACTIVE APPROACH: A MEDIA DEFENDANT'S
COURSE OF ACTION

A. The Justification-HarmonizationHindered by
Features in the Frame
Though legal reform harmonizing conflicting defamation laws may
appear to be a very simple solution to a very complex problem, courts
are hesitant to implement change on their own initiative. Additionally,
consensus for an international agreement would be difficult to reach. As
the High Court of Australia has stated, reforming the conflicting defamation
laws involves both a "settled" and "sensitive" area of law; thus "it should
cause no surprise when the courts decline the invitation to solve problems
[the legislature], in a much better position to devise solutions, have
neglected to repair." 182 Further, any international agreement governing
Internet and global publications would not likely serve the interest of every
party with a stake in their dissemination. 83 The conflicting substantive
and procedural laws have emerged as a product of differences that inhere
in both the structure and policies driving each jurisdiction's laws.
Reform by way of an international agreement, or the courts for that
matter, would require that each respective party compromise the longstanding principles to which they now adhere, including the United
States.
As the conflict between these defamation laws in the global scheme
stems from differences embedded in their underlying legal frames,
"there are limits on the extent to which national courts can provide
radical solutions,"' 184 and "[n]o elegant utopian solution" by way of an
international agreement is ever likely to emerge. i85 Thus, legal reform is
unlikely to come into fiuition. Rather than reiterate the need for or proposing
various methods to achieve harmonization among the defamation laws,
this article accepts the difficulties associated with this approach as a
product of their development. Further, it acknowledges the First
Amendment's limits abroad and takes a different approach-a proactive
approach. American publishers cannot rely on external forces to provide
182.

Gutnick, 210 C.L.R. at 643.

183. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Harmonizing Cybertort Law for
Europe and America, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 13, 51 (2005).

184.
185.

Gutnick, 210 C.L.R. at 643.
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 183, at 51.

them with a safe-harbor insulating them from potential liability abroad.
American publishers must, instead, act on their own accord both through
the courts and by modifying their internal practices if they hope to
reduce or eliminate their liability abroad.
B. Through the Courts-ForDefendants Possessing
Domestic Assets Alone
Where an American defendant publishes via the Internet or another
global medium, he creates the potential for a cause of action initiated
abroad. To avoid being subject to suit, he may utilize the courts by
(1) seeking an anti-suit injunction, (2) challenging jurisdiction through
forum non conveniens, or (3) resisting enforcement. While the prospect of
obtaining an order enjoining the foreign action or negating the foreign
court's jurisdiction is slim, a final judgment contravening that defendant's
First Amendment rights will not be enforced on American soil. As such,
the defendant retains the First Amendment's full protection so long as he
does not possess any assets abroad against which the judgment may be
enforced.
1. Anti-Suit Injunction
If an American defendant faces suit abroad, he may, petition an
American court for an anti-suit injunction. Issuance of an anti-suit injunction
preserves the defendant's First Amendment protections and thwarts a
plaintiffs attempt at foreign forum shopping. 186 However, such an issuance
is problematic. The injunction would undermine the foreign jurisdiction's
reputational protections by allowing the defendant to shield himself with
the First Amendment, even though he has published a defamatory
statement abroad. 87 Additionally, obtaining an anti-suit injunction in the
United States requires that the defendant satisfy the "actual controversy"
standard 188 outlined by the Declaratory Judgment Act. 89 He must
demonstrate a "substantial controversy, between the parties having
adverse legal interests, of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the
' 190
[injunction's] issuance."
However, to do so, may present an insurmountable hurdle. For
instance, in Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods, Ltd., Dow Jones mistook an

186. Di Bari, supra note 125, at 149.
187. Id.
188. Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Harrods, Ltd., 237 F. Supp. 2d 394, 405 (S.D.N.Y.
2002), affd, 346 F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 2003).
189. Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2004).
190. Id.

[VOL. 9: 367, 2008]

Confronting the Limits of the FirstAmendment
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.

April Fool's Day joke by Harrods regarding whether the company would
hold an initial public offering as a true statement and published a
statement in both the Wall Street Journal's print version and website
announcing the decision. 9I Upon discovering the mistake, Dow Jones
corrected it the following day, but the Wall Street Journal responded by
publishing its own story regarding a potential public offering entitled,
"The Enron of Britain."192 Infuriated by the link made between its
company and Enron, Harrods began preparing to commence an action in
the United Kingdom. It requested information regarding the Wall Street
Journal's circulation and the number
of hits its website had received
93
since the statement was published. 1
Rather than provide the disclosure, Dow Jones sought an anti-suit
injunction in the Southern District of New York to enjoin the libel suit
that Harrods commenced in London's High Court of Justice. 194 Dow
Jones sought the injunction based on the following arguments: (a) the
cost to defend itself in England would be an immense burden on the
company, 195 (b) without the single publication rule, the company could
be held liable for the continued publication of the article, 196 (c) that the
suit, if commenced in the United States, would be dismissed either as an
opinion whose falsity could not be proven or for lack of fault,' 97 and
(d) even if the suit continued in England the judgment would be
unenforceable in the United States. 98 The Southern District of New
York was not persuaded by any of these arguments and failed to find
that Dow Jones had met the actual controversy standard.' 99 In the
191.
192.

Harrods,237 F. Supp. 2d at 400.
Id. at 402.

193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 403.
Id.

197. Id. at 402.
198.
Id. at 407. Dow Jones reasoned that because Harrods's claim would be nonactionable in American Courts, to enforce the judgment would contravene Dow Jones's
First Amendment rights and, thus, be repugnant to the United States Constitution.
199. Id. The Court clearly stated, that "the Court is not persuaded that under the
circumstances presented here Dow Jones has met its burden to sufficiently demonstrate
the existence of an actual controversy." First, the controversy was not sufficiently real

and immediate because the greater portion of Dow Jones's arguments were based on
assumptions regarding the future that were not yet certain. It was not clear that the case
would actually proceed to trial, that Harrods would win a judgment, or that Harrods
would attempt to enforce the judgment in the United States. Id. at 408-09. Second,
though Dow Jones's First Amendment rights were at issue in the suit, that did not
necessarily mean that the judgment would threaten to curb or chill speech; therefore,

alternative, Dow Jones argued that the actual controversy standard should
be relaxed, for the potential suit would undermine its First Amendment
rights. 200 Again, the Court was not persuaded and found that the allegations
were not "sufficiently concrete, objective or specific" enough to find an
actual controversy or justify the "extraordinary" relief that Dow Jones
sought. 20 1 The Southern District of New York was unable to find a basis
for the authority to extend the First Amendment's protections to Internet
publications that properly fell under a foreign court's jurisdiction.20 2
Though a foreign cause of action may undermine the First Amendment's
speech protections abroad, American courts are highly unlikely to undermine
a foreign court's ability to enforce its own laws. 2 3 An American court
may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over a defamatory statement
published abroad via the Internet or some other global media,20 4 but it
will hesitate to prevent a foreign court from exerting that very same
authority, even if it adversely affects the domestic rights of publishers in
the United States.20 5 An American publisher may only rely on the First
Amendment's protections to shield him from suit within the United
States.20 6
2. Forum Non Conveniens
Though the American defendant may not be able to enjoin the foreign
suit, he may appear in the foreign court and challenge its jurisdiction by
there was not an actual conflict at that time. Id. at 409-10. Third, the Court feared controverting
principles of comity by preventing litigation abroad on the grounds that it offended our
Constitution. Id. at 411. Fourth, the Court distinguished cases where a foreign judgment
was not enforced because there is a difference between enjoining a suit before it takes
place and declining to enforce it after it has occurred. Id. at 416. Lastly, though the
Court could have exercised its discretion and issued the injunction despite these other
considerations, it declined to do so. Id. at 437-47.
200. Id. at 409.
201. Id.at410.
202. Id. at 411.

203. See id. (declining to issue an anti-suit injunction and prevent the commencement of
a foreign defamation suit).
204. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1119 (W.D. Pa.
1997) ; see also Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 263 (4th Cir. 2002).
Based on the sliding scale approach to jurisdiction established by Zippo as modified by

Young, an American court may conceivably exert extraterritorial jurisdiction over a
publisher of an online defamatory statement so long as the statement is featured on an
interactive website of a commercial nature and is targeted at an American audience. Id.
205. See Harrods, 237 F. Supp. 2d. at 407-11, 416, 437-47 (explaining that the
issuance of an anti-suit injunction to prevent a foreign defamation suit would be
improper based on the uncertainty of ex ante decision making and principles of comity).
206. Due to the practical difficulties associated with obtaining an anti-suit
injunction because of the conflict presented by foreign defamation law and the First
Amendment, a potential defendant cannot rely on this form of relief as a means to
effectively extend the First Amendment's protections abroad.
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objecting to the writ through an assertion of forum non conveniens.
However, the likelihood that an American defendant would succeed is
slim, for once a foreign court has determined that the location of the
harm, that is the place of publication, is within its territory, the foreign
court becomes the natural forum.2 °7 Moreover, it is discretionary whether
an English court exercises jurisdiction over the defendant initially, 20 8 or
an English or Australian court maintains jurisdiction over an objection of
forum non conveniens. °9 Where the foreign court is the natural forum
for the suit, the prospects of arguing it is an abuse of discretion to
maintain jurisdiction rather than declare it an inappropriate forum fall to
the wayside. For example, in Gutnick, the High Court of Australia
declared that Australian courts will only decline to exercise jurisdiction
on the basis of forum non conveniens where the defendant can show that
jurisdiction is clearly inappropriate.2 10 In that case, because publication
took place in Victoria, the plaintiff was a resident and conducted
business in Victoria, and the plaintiff had a reputation to defend in
Victoria, the Australian High Court could not find that the jurisdiction
was either clearly inappropriate or that the trial court judge had abused
his discretion by declining to set aside the writ on the basis of forum non
conveniens. 2 11 Rather, the trial court judge's exercise of discretion was
"plainly correct. '2 12
As the High Court of Australia did in Gutnick, the English Court of
Appeal in Lewis also emphasized that the trial judge's initial jurisdiction
inquiry is primarily a discretionary matter. 213 The English Court of
Appeal clearly stated that appeals based on forum non conveniens

207. King v. Lewis, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1329, (2005) E.M.L.R. 45, 54 (Eng.);
Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Gutnick, (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, 590, 647 (Austl.).
208. Lewis, E.M.L.R. at 47-48, 54 (explaining that grant of leave to serve a writ on
a non-resident defendant and obtain jurisdiction over him is a matter of discretion based
on a finding that the English court is the more appropriate forum for suit).
209. Lewis, E.M.L.R. at 54 (discussing challenging the service of a writ through
forum non conveniens, explaining that "the real question in these cases [is], which was
the more appropriate forum," and maintaining that such questions are a matter of
discretion); Gutnick, 210 C.L.R. at 647 (stating "[a]s to the plea of forum non conveniens, we
perceive no appellable error in the exercise of the [Australian] judge's discretion" in
denying the challenge to jurisdiction based on forum non conveniens).
210. Gutnick, 210 C.L.R at 596.
211. Id. at647.
212. Id.
213. See Lewis, E.M.L.R. at 54.

"should be rare and the appellate court should be slow to interfere. 2 t4
In England, a defendant must show that the forum is not the "more
appropriate forum" to negate jurisdiction on the basis of forum non
conveniens.21 5 With these principles in view, the English Court of Appeal
in Lewis outlined four "strands in the learning" relevant to the circumstances
regarding forum non conveniens arguments in the context of Internet
libel.21 6 First, like the High Court of Australia, the English Court of
Appeal found that the "natural or appropriate" forum is the location of
the tort's commission, and in this context, the place of publication,
because "it is manifestly just and reasonable that a defendant should
have to answer for his wrongdoing" where his actions took place. 217 The
English Court of Appeal found it difficult to accept the proposition that a
court possessing jurisdiction over a tort would not also be an appropriate
forum for the case.218
Second, the English Court of Appeal considered the plaintiffs
connection with the forum.21 9 In the context of a defamation suit, evidence
of publication in other forums may be a primary factor on the decision of
whether jurisdiction is appropriate. Its weight will vary depending on
the strength on the plaintiffs connections to the forum-that is the
stronger the plaintiffs connection to the forum, the more likely that the
claim will survive. 220 Third, the English Court of Appeal considered the
medium of publication. 221 In the context of Internet publication, the judge's
discretion will be more "open-textured," and the court's consideration
222
should "give effect to the publisher's choice of a global medium.,
Though the English Court of Appeal indicated that each determination
will depend on the circumstances surrounding the case, the court seemed
to imply that where the defendant chooses to publish via global media,
the court will give effect to that decision by bringing the statements
published under its jurisdiction. 3 Again, the English Court of Appeal
reiterated that each of the first three considerations are "matters of
practical reasoning, and not legal rules" that "will inform the judge who
must decide where the balance of convenience lies. 224
214. Id. (quoting Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., [1987] A.C. 460, 465,
474-75 (Eng.)).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 55
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 58.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 59.
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Only the last factor is a question of law-whether the venue chosen by
the plaintiff is the most objectively appropriate forum.225 Under this factor
of the inquiry, the prospect that the plaintiff has chosen the forum to gain
an advantage in litigation only comes into play if the judge has first found
that the forum is, in fact, appropriate. 226 Even at this point, the question
is not whether the plaintiff is forum shopping, but rather whether or not
"trial in England is required if substantial justice is to be done between
the parties. 227 Because English defamation laws give priority to the
individual's reputation, it would be hard to argue that justice between the
parties is more effectively served by either dismissing the case entirely
or staying the proceeding to allow its continuance in the United States
where the plaintiff would lose some of the protection that English law
afforded him.
Because forum non conveniens is a discretionary matter, demonstrating
that a forum is clearly inappropriate or not the more appropriate forum
despite its jurisdiction over the location of the harm is difficult indeed.
English and Australian defamation laws are protective of an individual's
reputation; thus, an American publisher cannot rely on arguments regarding
forum non conveniens to evade the cause of action provided to remedy
injury wherever it may occur. Additionally, the judge's discretion comes
into play. Further, the imbalance in the extraterritorial application of each
forum's laws only compounds the unlikelihood that an assertion of
forum non conveniens would succeed. This is because if jurisdiction is
not proper in America, an American defendant does not even have the
option to assert forum non conveniens. The English and Australian
courts would be the only appropriate forums.
3. Enforcement
Where an American court declines to enjoin a foreign plaintiff from
commencing a defamation action abroad and a foreign court declines to
relinquish its jurisdiction over the action, an American defendant still has
two domestic remedies. As a proactive measure, an American defendant may
seek a declaratory judgment deeming the eventual foreign judgment
unenforceable; as a reactive measure, an American defendant may argue
that a foreign judgment is unenforceable once the foreign plaintiff seeks
225.

Id. at 60.

226.

Id.

227.

Id.

its enforcement. In either case, American courts will evaluate enforceability
according to the "repugnancy" standard set out in the Restatement (Third)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.228 Under the repugnancy
standard, American courts will decline to enforce a foreign judgment if
"the cause of action on which the judgment was based, or the judgment
itself, is repugnant to the public policy of the United States and of the
State where recognition is sought."
However, the ability of the courts to deem a foreign judgment
unenforceable or decline to enforce it based on its repugnancy is not
unqualified, for "[t]he courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign
right" unless to do so "would violate some fundamental principle of
justice, .

.

. some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal[th]. 2 29 Both

courses of action implicate principles of comity that require courts to
balance both the relationship between the United States and foreign
governments, as well as the rights held between the diverse parties to the
action. The United States Supreme Court has defined comity as "the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens
or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws., 230 Repugnancy
is the exception, not the rule-a foreign judgment may be enforceable as
a matter of comity but, nevertheless, 23
not
enforced on a finding that the
1

judgment conflicts with public policy.

Notwithstanding this restriction based on comity, it seems clear that
judgments contravening an American defendant's First Amendment rights
satisfy the repugnancy standard. For the same reasons that American courts
hesitate to grant an anti-suit injunction, American courts also hesitate to
provide an American defendant with a declaratory judgment.2 32 However,
228.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482(2)(d); accord

Yahoo! v. La Lingue Contra Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1214 (9th
Cir. 2006) (observing that repugnancy standard is generally followed in the United States
courts).
229. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111 (1918). The Court remarked:
A right of action is property. If a foreign statute gives the right, the mere fact
that we do not give a like right is no reason for refusing to help the plaintiff in
getting what belongs to him. We are not so provincial as to say that every
solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home.
Id. at 110-111.
230. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 123 (1895) (establishing the principle that
while judgments rendered by states within the United States are constitutionally entitled
to full, faith and credit, foreign judgments are not).
231. See In re Stephanie M., 867 P.2d 706 (Cal. 1994) (finding that a Mexican
guardianship decree was enforceable as a matter of comity but declining to enforce the
decree based on its conflict with public policy).
232. See Yahoo!, 433 F.3d 1199 (declining to provide declaratory relief in the
context of a French defamation case based on its finding that the action was premature).
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once a foreign plaintiff has a final judgment and seeks 2to33 enforce it on
American soil, the courts will likely decline to enforce it.
For example, in Yahoo v. La Lingue Contra Le Racisme et
L 'Antisemitisme, the Ninth Circuit recently addressed whether a declaratory
judgment could be sought in the context of a French defamation
action.234 In that case, an American auction held via the Internet
featured Nazi memorabilia that could be accessed by and sold to French
citizens even though French law strictly prohibited such items within
French borders. 235 A French citizen won a French order that required the
American site to restrict access to its site or remove the memorabilia.
When the order was not subsequently followed, the French court ordered
fines for non-compliance.23 6 Yahoo! sought declaratory relief that the
order was unenforceable within the United States. However, the Ninth
Circuit declined to provide such relief finding that the action was
premature due to uncertainty with respect to the application of the First
Amendment on foreign soil. 237 Remarking that "[t]he extent of First

Amendment protection of speech accessible solely by those outside the
United States is a difficult and, to some degree, unresolved issue," the
Ninth Circuit could not find that complying with the French orders to
restrict access to the memorabilia "in France" necessarily offended
either California public policy or the First Amendment.2 38
Without a foreign plaintiff taking action to enforce a judgment
rendered abroad against an American defendant, courts may hesitate to
provide declaratory relief based on the uncertainty involved in providing
prospective relief. Additionally, "[i]nconsistency with American law is
not necessarily enough 'to prevent recognition and enforcement of a
foreign judgment in the United States., 239 The foreign judgment must be

233. Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'ns, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1992); Telnikoffv. Matusevich, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997).
234.

See Yahoo!, 433 F.3d 1199 at 1204.

235. Id. at 1202.
236. Id. at 1203.
237. Id. at 1218. Other uncertainties also surrounded the Ninth Circuit's decision:
(a) The French order was an interim decision that could be modified; (b) Yahoo! had "in
large measure" begun to comply with the order, so the French court might not require
"full and literal compliance"; and (c) the Ninth Circuit did not "know what effect, if any,
compliance . ..would have on Yahoo!'s protected speech-related activities." Id. at
1215-16.
238. Id. at 1217.
239. Id. at 1215.

both inconsistent and repugnant. 240 Rendering a prospective judgment
based on uncertain factors may violate this principle. Further, as stated
above, repugnancy is the exception rather than the rule. With this
hierarchy in view, a court may be wise to take the prudential route and
decline to render any decisions until faced with a plaintiff seeking to
enforce the judgment. This takes the determination outside the realm of
uncertainty and relocates it to the realm of actual controversy.
In contrast, when facing a final judgment that clearly contravenes the
First Amendment's speech protections, American courts will not hesitate
to decline enforcement.2 4' The repugnancy of such judgments as to the
public policy of the United States, or any State in which recognition is
sought, is well-established.242 American courts have held that a foreign
judgment meets the repugnancy standard on several grounds, including
differences in the relevant standards of proof, substantive law, and
traditions between the United States and foreign countries.243 In this
context, an American defendant's First Amendment rights take priority
over principles of international comity that would give effect to the
foreign plaintiffs reputational rights. The Maryland Court of Appeals'
judgment in Telnikoff v. Matusevich lends support for this conclusion
holding that differences between the protection afforded to freedom of
expression as opposed to the individual's reputation under English law
were so significant that a foreign judgment could not be given effect,
despite an English citizen's argument that principles
of international
2 44
comity required the Court to enforce the judgment.
Because American courts firmly protect American publishers'
freedom of expression within our borders by declining to enforce foreign
judgments, foreign defamation laws should not operate to the detriment
of the speech protections provided by the First Amendment within the
United States. 245 Thus, Americans who possess assets located solely on
240. Id. (reiterating that "[t]he foreign judgment must be, in addition, repugnant to
public policy").
241. See Abdullah v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 2515 (LLS), 1994
WL 419847, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1994); see also Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'ns,
Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1992); see also Telnikoff v. Matusevich,
702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997).
242. Abdullah, 1994 WL 419847; Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d 661; Telnikoff, 702 A.2d
230.
243. Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (declining to enforce an English defamation
judgment based on the differences between the substantive law including the standard of
proof and protection afforded to freedom of expression).
244. Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 248.
245. Abdullah, 1994 WL 419847 at *7 (declining to enforce an English libel
judgment based on its determination that an "establishment of a claim under the British
law of defamation would be antithetical to the First Amendment"); Telnikoff 702 A.2d
230; Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d 661.
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American soil need not fear the prospect of liability abroad for potentially
defamatory statements published on the Internet.
C. Through Modifying Internal Practices-ForDefendants
Possessing ForeignAssets
Though American courts will protect publishers' First Amendment
rights within their borders, there is still the issue of how to protect
publishers from liability abroad. In the case of a publisher with assets
located in many different jurisdictions, a judgment rendered against him
for a defamatory statement that would otherwise be protected by the
First Amendment may, nevertheless, be enforced. Out from under the
American courts' protection, these publishers must modify their internal
practices to reduce their seemingly limitless liability abroad. They may
consider the following solutions: (1) employ a website disclaimer or
visitor agreement, (2) reform their technology use to restrict access to
their materials, or (3) purchase media liability insurance.
1. Website Disclaimers& Visitor Agreements
Those who publish on the Internet may attempt to employ either a
website disclaimer or a visitor agreement in order to reduce their liability
in the event that they are hauled into a foreign court based on a defamation
action. Web publishers and operators typically deny responsibility
for potentially defamatory statements in either a general disclaimer or
visitor agreement by noting that the content supplied by users is not well
monitored and may lack accuracy or even offend viewers. 24 Those
utilizing visitor agreements will generally instruct users against posting
defamatory or obscene material and reserve the right to remove material
for any reason and at any time.248 More extensive agreements may
attempt to disclaim liability for damages entirely.2 49 Though utilizing a
website disclaimer or visitor agreement may, in theory, be good practice,
the extent to which either tool will be enforced or reduce a publisher's
246. Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Gutnick, (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, 629-30 (Austl.)
(recognizing the "difficulty or impossibility" of enforcing judgments against foreign
defendants where they do not possess assets in the jurisdiction).
247. Johnathon D. Hart et al., 523 PLI/PAT 123, 169 (1998) (exploring the

potential for web publishers to incorporate website disclaimers or visitor agreements as a
means to avoid liability abroad).
248. Id.
249. Id.

liability is constrained by the relevant jurisdiction's contract law and, in
particular, whether the provision will be deemed unconscionable by the
standards of that jurisdiction. 250
While the contract laws and standards of unconscionability may vary,
a common factor in determining whether to enforce the disclaimers or
agreements is generally whether or not they are "effectively brought to
the attention of users. '251 Bringing the disclaimer or visitor agreement to
the user's attention generally takes one of the following three forms.
First, publishers may require users to assent to the terms of the agreement
by clicking on an icon indicating agreement, which would provide the
publisher with grounds to argue that the user bound himself to the
terms.252 However, this method is not fool-proof. A user may stumble
onto material through another website's link and avoid the agreement all
together.253 In the alternative, publishers may place a link in an obvious
place on their own webpage that takes the user directly to the visitor
agreement and pair the link with language stating that the user agrees to
the terms by virtue of viewing the site.2 54 Lastly, publishers may place
the link in an area that provides general information to users about the
site. 255 However, this is the weakest option. It may seem logical, but
due to the less obvious placement of the terms, the agreement is less
likely to be enforced. 6
Although a disclaimer or a visitor agreement may appear to be a
simple solution to a complex problem that could prevent a great deal of
liability, the likelihood that one could construct a disclaimer or agreement
that satisfies each jurisdiction's laws is highly unlikely. A better approach
would be to have the author of the disclaimer or agreement acquire
knowledge of each jurisdiction's laws regulating the content of the
publication.25 7 Further, the extent of protection for the disclaimer or
agreement will vary among different courts and be evaluated on an ad
hoc basis taking into consideration the circumstances of each case.258
Even if the visitor agreement requires a user to assent to the agreement
by clicking on the screen, a publisher may still encounter difficulty
250.
251.

Id. at 171.
Id.

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id.
Id.
Id.
ld
Id.
Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Geo-Location Technologies and Other Means of

Placing Borders on the 'Borderless' Internet, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
101, 124 (2004) (advocating the use of geo-location technology over other methods to
reduce liability abroad).
258. Id.
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trying to prove that the user, despite his assent to the terms, actually read
them.259 The terms may be regarded as boiler-point language agreed to
without any form of negotiation. 260 The lack of negotiation between the
publisher and website user compounded with a, more often than not,
lack of sophistication on the part of the web-user 261 makes these
disclaimers and agreements particularly susceptible to challenge.
2. Geo-Location Technology
Given the weaknesses that inhere in the use of a disclaimer or visitor
agreement as a method for limiting liability, a better solution may be for
publishers to employ geo-location technology in order to restrict access
to their sites or, at a minimum, determine where they may be potentially
liable and modify their publications accordingly. 262 While a publisher
may argue that access to online publications is both uncontrollable
and unpredictable, the advancements in geo-location technologies may
weaken this position. The technologies provide publishers with the
means to monitor the location of those who access their sites and modify
their sites accordingly to conform to a certain jurisdiction's laws.26 '
Courts have begun to take notice of the potential for publishers to
limit their liability and regulate the content of their sites through the use
of geo-location technology. As such, they now factor this ability into
their decisions. 264 Geo-location technology provides publishers with a
method for determining the physical location of their online publications
as well as those who access them by linking a user's network address to
their physical location.2 65 The physical location of the user may be used
259.
260.
261.

Id. at 125.
Id.
Id. at 126.

262. Geo-location technology allows a publisher to determine the actual physical
location of both his online publications and audience by way of the network addresses of
those accessing the material through the Internet. Svantesson, supra note 257, at 118;
accord Matthew Fagin, Regulating Speech Across Borders: Technology v. Values, 9

& TECH. REV. 395, 412 (2003).
263. Yahoo! v. La Lingue Contra Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199,
1203 (9th Cir. 2006). Though Yahoo! contended that it had no means to restrict French
access to the Nazi memorabilia, the French court obtained a report concluding almost
90% of the website users could be identified through geo-location technology or
requiring that users declare their nationality before accessing the site. Id.
264. Id; accord Svantesson, supra note 257, at 118; accord Fagin, supra note 262,
MICH. TELECOMM.

at 412.
265.

Fagin, supra note 262, at 412.

to filter whether or not a user will be granted access to the requested
website.2 66 Where a user from an unintended jurisdiction attempts to
access the material published on the website, the server may block his
access or lead the user to a version of the site prepared for users from
that location.267
However, this technology is not entirely accurate. Accuracy, as reported
by technology vendors, is determined by checking a sample of user
locations as reported by the software against the locations provided by
the customers; however, there is not a reliable method for verifying this
information. 268 Moreover, web-users have methods for circumventing the
technology; these methods range from avoiding access to the HTTP
servers to simply preserving their anonymity. 269 With the potential for
inaccuracy, some users that should not be granted access will gain it,
while others that should be granted access will be denied it. 270 Despite
the potential for the technology's inaccuracy, it may still be regarded as
reliable enough for publishers to both monitor and regulate access to
their sites and for the courts to include it among their considerations
when evaluating a case. 271 As advancements continue to be made, publishers
may be expected to comply with the local laws of each jurisdiction in
which their publications appear, for not only will they have the means to
control access to their materials, but also, liability would be uncontrovertibly
foreseeable.
3. Media Liability Insurance
As a preventive measure, publishers may also purchase media liability
insurance in anticipation of possible defamation actions commenced
abroad. The risk of liability that the media undertakes in publishing
online articles has been well recognized in the insurance field, and the
insurance companies have responded to the demand for e-commerce
insurance accordingly. The insurance industry is attuned to the fact that
the media's First Amendment protections do not extend beyond our
borders and that while a publication may be acceptable for American
audiences, it may not be as well received abroad.27

266. Svantesson, supra note 257, at 110.
267. Id.
268. Id. at l ll.
269. Id. at 113.
270. Id. at 114 (referring to Roger Clarke's False Positives or False Negatives effect
of inaccuracy).
271. Id.
272. John E. Black Jr. et al., Dangers Lurk in Cyberspace, Bus. L. TODAY, JulyAug., at 41, 42 (2002).
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However, because media liability insurance in the context of e-commerce
is a new market, the policies are not uniform, nor is there a great deal of
case law interpreting their terms.273 Therefore, publishers must carefully
review the terms. Though this may be a taxing process, given the level
of complexity embodied in each policy, 2 74 it is possible to acquire the
7
necessary coverage. 275
Often media liability policies include coverage for
defamation actions, both libel and slander, as well as a commitment by
the insurer to defend the policy holder.2 76 Furthermore, in recognition of
the high costs of such a policy, some insurance providers have constructed
policies aimed specifically at businesses whose risk of liability stems
only from their presence on the Internet.277
The question of whether or not a publisher should obtain insurance is
no longer an issue. Rather, acquisition of insurance for media liability is
now regarded as a duty of the corporate risk manager. A corporate risk
manager has the duty to "be aware of the .. .risks [associated with
Internet activity] and to actively manage their corporate risk exposure.' 278
These risks include those associated with the "[n]ew levels of cyberexposure" as a result of defamation actions abroad.279 Though a publisher
may potentially reduce his liability abroad by constructing a disclaimer
or visitor agreement for his website or by employing geo-location
technology, neither course of action is foolproof and may still leave a
publisher, despite his best efforts, open to liability. Thus, media publishers
should take this risk into consideration and actively seek insurance in
order to acquire the best protection possible.
IV. CONCLUSION

Though each evolved from a common tradition, differences rooted in
both the structure and policies driving the American, English and
Australian defamation laws have led to a divergence in the priority that
each accords to freedom of expression and the individual's reputation.
273. Id. at 43.
274. Id. at 44; accord James R. Borelli, Caveat Emptor: A Buyer's Guide to Media
Liability Insurance, COMM. LAW., Winter 2006, at 23 (noting that media liability policies
differ in price and quality).
275. Charles L. Simmons, Jr., Business Insurance Targets Risks Posed by New
Technology, MD. B.J., Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 36.

276.
277.
278.
279.

Id. at41.
Id.
Black, supra note 272, at 41.
Id. at 42.

Where global publication comes into play, this divergence produces a
readily apparent conflict-the countries' respective substantive laws call
for different results, yet their respective procedural laws provide an
avenue for each to govern. American defamation law developed with a
constitutional element grounded in the First Amendment that required
priority be accorded to freedom of expression and entrenched this value
in the law's underlying structure. However, English and Australian law
developed from the common law tradition alone and maintained much of
the priority that it accorded to the individual's reputation. Though both
England and Australia are beginning to afford more protection to speech
in matters of public concern through the traditional qualified privilege,
neither has yet developed a substantial equivalent to the protection
afforded by the First Amendment.
Each jurisdiction has assigned a different priority to the competing
values through its substantive laws. This has created an incentive for
plaintiffs to forum shop and influenced the procedural laws that allow
plaintiffs to do so. The prospect of liability abroad for speech that
would, otherwise, fall under the First Amendment's protection in the
United States has increased significantly with the advent of global
publication and the Internet. This is because global publications provide
courts around the world with the ability to exercise jurisdiction and
apply their laws to defamation cases. In response, American courts have
protected the defendant's free speech rights procedurally. They limit
both the fora and claims available to an aggrieved plaintiff through the
minimal contacts approach and the single publication rule. In contrast,
English and Australian courts have protected the plaintiff's reputational
rights procedurally by maintaining the fora and claims available to him.
Their adherence to an approach which bases jurisdiction on the location
of the harm and to the multiple publication rule provides the plaintiff a
means to vindicate his reputation wherever and whenever it may be
harmed. Based on the level of compromise that would be involved in
bringing about legal reform, harmonization among the jurisdictions is
unlikely to occur. Thus, American publishers must recognize the limitation
on First Amendment's protection abroad and confront their potential
liability proactively both through the courts and by modifying their
internal practices.
Once an American defendant is served with a writ of originating
process from abroad, there is little action that he can do until a final
judgment is rendered against him. While an American defendant may
appear in the foreign jurisdiction and argue forum non conveniens,
foreign courts are not likely to abstain from exercising jurisdiction, for
doing so would likely strip the plaintiff of the protections their laws
afford to his reputation. In the alternative, an American defendant may
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petition an American court for either an anti-suit injunction enjoining the
action or a declaratory judgment stating the judgment is unenforceable
within the United States. Even though a foreign judgment would likely
contravene the American defendant's First Amendment protection, American
courts will, nevertheless, hesitate to grant either form of relief. Both
courses of action implicate principles of comity that American courts
will not violate where the uncertainty of granting prospective relief is
concerned. However, once a plaintiff has a final judgment, an American
defendant may contest its enforceability. American courts will protect
the defendant's freedom of expression within our borders. They will
decline to enforce judgments that contravene the First Amendment based
on the repugnance of such judgments to American public policy. Thus,
an American defendant can act through the courts to prevent foreign
defamation laws from limiting the First Amendment's speech protections
on American soil so long as he does not possess assets abroad.
However, the protections of the First Amendment stop there, for many
publishers operate on a multinational level and possess assets abroad
against which such judgments may be enforced. Therefore, American
publishers must also modify their internal practices. They may (a) post a
disclaimer or require a visitor agreement, (b) utilize geo-location technology
to restrict access to the publication to certain locations, and (c) obtain
media liability insurance. Though it is unclear whether a disclaimer or
visitor agreement will be upheld and geo-location technology may at
times be inaccurate, both possess the potential to reduce a publisher's
risk of liability abroad. Moreover, with the availability of media liability
insurance, publishers possess the means to protect themselves in the
event that either of these methods fails. Those in the American media must
understand that while Americans value free speech, the First Amendment
protects speech only within our borders. Once statements cross our
borders through a physical or online publication, they must conform to
the standards applied in each jurisdiction where they appear. The
American media cannot expect foreign jurisdictions to abandon their
traditions in order to preserve our own. With avenues available to
reduce liability, the American media may continue expressing itself as it
has within our borders, but it must respect the extent to which that
expression may be received abroad.
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